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ARTICLE 
STRATEGIES OF PUBLIC UDAP ENFORCEMENT 
PRENTISS Cox, AMY WIDMAN & MARK TorrEN* 
Abstract: Laws protecting consumers from unfair and deceptive acts and 
practices-commonly called "UDAP" laws-have played a stunning role in re-
cent years. State and federal enforcers plied these laws more than any other to 
hold individuals and companies accountable for the Great Recession, while 
chalking up record payouts. 
Given the outsized role these statutes play, critics have directed their sights 
on both the laws and the enforcers who wield them. Missing from this debate, 
however, is an account of the actual conduct of UDAP enforcement in America. 
How do public UDAP enforcers exercise their considerable discretion? This ar-
ticle examines every UDAP matter resolved by state and federal enforcers in 
2014 and presents the initial results of the first comprehensive empirical study of 
public UDAP enforcement. 
Across a range of attributes, public UDAP enforcement varies while also 
revealing clear patterns. We organize the data to show how enforcers employ 
distinct strategies. The two main federal enforcers adopt sharply different ap-
proaches, especially regarding targets and relief The state enforcers divide into 
seven distinct strategies, distinguished not only by case variables, but also by 
case quantity and leadership in multi-enforcer actions. The picture that emerges 
should shape the policy and scholarly debate on public UDAP enforcement and 
help optimize the work of public enforcers. 
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l. INTRODUCTION 
In the hands of public enforcers, laws protecting consumers from unfair 
and deceptive acts and practices---commonly called "UDAP" laws-have 
played a stunning role in recent years. State and federal enforcers plied these 
laws more than any other to hold individuals and companies accountable for 
the Great Recession.' When Congress created the Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Bureau ("CFPB") in 2010 to prevent future crises, the agency's sin-
gle most important weapon was the power to prevent "unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive act[s] or practice[s]."2 UDAP laws have chalked up record-setting 
payouts against some of the nation's most powerful companies, including the 
1 See Mark Totten, The Enforcers & the Great Recession, 36 CARDOZO L. REv. 1611, 
1654 (2015). 
2 12 U.S.C. § 553 l(a) (2012). 
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$181 million Risperdal Settlement3 and the $50 billion National Mortgage 
Settlement.4 Moreover, as state attorneys general ("AGs") have ascended to 
national prominence in recent years, altering the balance of federalism in 
America, UDAP powers have arguably defined the role and reach of this 
office more than anything else. 5 
The spotlight on these laws shows no signs of dimming. The new Ad-
ministration has promised to weaken, if not wipe out, the CFPB and its 
UDAP power, setting up a bitter contest between the agency's friends and 
foes.6 As happened in the years leading up to the financial crisis, some state 
enforcers are banding together, using their UDAP laws to police the market-
place and fill the gaps left by waning federal enforcement.7 Moreover, with 
growing constraints on the private consumer class action, public enforce-
ment of UDAP laws may increase as a means of consumer redress.8 These 
developments will fix a steady beam on public UDAP enforcement. 
3 Press Release, Ariz. Att'y Gen., Home Announces Largest Multi-State Pharmaceutical 
Settlement over Alleged Improper Marketing (Aug. 30, 2012), https://www.azag.gov/press-
release/home-announces-largest-multi-state-pharmaceutical-settlement-over-alleged-improper 
[https://perma.cc/MH37-V6KS]. 
4 See Settlement Documents, JOINT STATE-FED. NAT'L MoRTG. SERVICING SEITLEMENTS, 
http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/settlement-documents [https://perma.cc/W8ZZ-
5FRG] (collecting documents, including the complaint and the consent judgments). 
5 See PAUL NOLE'ITE, FEDERALISM ON ThIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND NATIONAL 
POLICYMAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 19-30 (2015); Cornell W. Clayton, Law, Politics 
and the New Federalism: State Attorneys General as National Policymakers, 56 REV. POL. 
525, 535-36 (1994 ); Lynn Mather, The Politics of Litigation by State Attorneys General: Intro-
duction to Mini-Symposium, 25 LAW & PoL'Y 425, 425-26 (2003); Colin L. Provost, State 
Attorneys General, Entrepreneurship, and Consumer Protection in the New Federalism, 33 
Puauus 37, 43-44 (2003) [hereinafter Provost, Entrepreneurship]; Colin L. Provost, The 
Politics of Consumer Protection: Explaining State Attorney General Participation in Multi-
State Lawsuits, 59 POL. RES. Q. 609, 610-12 (2006) [hereinafter Provost, Politics]. 
6 See, e.g., Stacy Cowley, Consumer Protection Bureau Chief Braces for a Reckoning, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2016, at B 1, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/24/business/consumer-
protection-bureau-chief-braces-for-a-reckoning.html [https://perma.cc/Z38S-UUS8]; Suzanne 
O'Halloran, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Fights to Stay Alive under Trump, Fox 
Bus. (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/2017/0l/27/consumer-financial-
protection-bureau-fights-to-stay-alive-under-trump.html [https://perma.cc/24PU-G8EG]; Lu-
cinda Shen, Donald Trump ls Targeting an Agency That Has Recovered $11.8 Billion for Con-
sumers, FoRTUNE (Jan. 29, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/0l/27 /donald-trump-cfpb-
consumer-protection-financial-bureau-elizabeth-warren/ [https://perma.ccN4AG-N3ANJ. 
7 See Alexander Bums, How Attorneys General Became Democrats' Bulwark Against 
Trump, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2017, at A9, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/us/attomeys-
general-democrats-trump-travel-ban.html [https://perma.cc/5W7R-DFKW]; Laura Krantz & 
Jim O'Sullivan, Blue-state Attorneys General Lead Trump Resistance, Bos. GLOBE (Feb. 7, 
2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/massachusetts/2017 /02/06/state-ags-lead-charge-
against-trump/LCHc5CQrZMz V 1 JUd4c027M/story .html [https://perma.cc/YCT5-CNFL]. 
8 See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. Cm. L. REv. 623, 660 (2012) ("In our view, state 
attorneys general-alone among public enforcers-have the ability to fill the void left by class 
actions .... "); Deborah R. Hensler, Goldilocks and the Class Action, 126 HARV. L. REv. F. 
56, 56-57 (2012) (describing the need for public enforcement to fill the gap left by the decline 
in private class actions). See generally Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 
WASH. U. L. REv. 729 (2013) (surveying many ways courts and legislatures have weakened 
the private class action). 
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Given everything at stake, it comes as no surprise that critics have di-
rected their sights on UDAP laws and the enforcers who wield them. The 
most outspoken critics are advocates for industries that public UDAP enforc-
ers target.9 According to them, state attorneys general employ these laws to 
achieve political goals, outsourcing public litigation to private plaintiffs' 
lawyers who fund their campaigns and then grabbing headlines with large 
monetary awards. 10 These enforcers, the critics allege, devise novel theories 
of liability that no target could anticipate. 11 Enforcers then coerce settle-
ments and effectively serve as prosecutor, judge, and jury. 12 As a result, the 
critics charge, public enforcers usurp the legislative role with closed-door 
settlements that effectively regulate an entire industry and produce payouts 
that fund programs outside the appropriation process. 13 And to top it off, the 
enforcers pile on-a tactic the critics call "swarm litigation." 14 
More recently, scholars have voiced some of these concerns as well. 
Over the past several years, a distinct conversation on public civil enforce-
ment has emerged. 15 The participants have often focused on UDAP laws to 
explore the contours of public enforcement. For example, some scholars 
have argued that state AGs are not adequate representatives when obtaining 
money for consumers in public UDAP enforcement because of conflicts of 
interest inherent in their office. 16 Strikingly absent, however, is real-world 
data to evaluate public UDAP enforcement. As Deborah Hensler observes, 
the scholarly arguments are often "heavy on theory and light on empirics." 17 
The problem is not a missing footnote. Until now, wide-ranging data on 
public UDAP enforcement did not exist. 
This data is critical, however, for at least two reasons. At a theoretical 
level, normative accounts of public enforcement that lack an accurate 
description of the activity they purport to expound risk irrelevance and invite 
error. At a practical level, achieving effective and efficient public enforce-
ment demands first understanding how public enforcers use their powers. 
This article presents the initial results of the first empirical study of 
public UDAP enforcement across state and federal governments. We ex-
9 See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, UNPRINCIPLED PROSECUTION: ABUSE 
or POWER AND PROFITEERING IN THE NEW "LITIGATION SWARM" (2014) [hereinafter UNPRIN-
CIPLED PROSECUTION]; U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, ENFORCEMENT SLUSH 
FUNDS: FUNDING FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES WITH ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDS (2015). 
10 See UNPRINCIPLED PROSECUTION, supra note 9, at 7-11. 
11 See id. at 14-16. 
12 See id. at 17. 
13 See id. at 17-20. 
14 See id. at 3, 22. 
15 See Hensler, supra note 8, at 58; Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Pub-
lic: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 512-18 (2012) 
[hereinafter Lemos, Aggregate Litigation]; Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal 
Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 722-23 (2011) [hereinafter Lemos, State Enforcement]. 
16 See, e.g., Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 15, at 512-18; see also Lemos, State 
Enforcement, supra note 15, at 722-23. 
17 Hensler, supra note 8, at 58. 
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amine 798 cases: every UDAP matter resolved by the Federal Trade Com-
mission ("FTC"), the CFPB, state attorneys general, and state consumer 
protection agencies in 2014, whether working alone or in cooperation with 
each other. 18 Our study covers cases resolved not only by formal administra-
tive or judicial processes, but also by settlement. No previous study focused 
on UDAP, or any other area of public civil enforcement, has provided this 
comprehensive, national snapshot of state-level enforcement nor placed the 
state and federal data side-by-side. For each case we code for nearly 200 
distinct variables that include, but are not limited to, the forum, the parties, 
the claims, the alleged harms, the product or service at issue, and the nature 
of the relief obtained. 
Our aim is to describe public UDAP enforcement in the United States. 
We attempt to answer a single question: How do public enforcers exercise 
their considerable discretion to enforce UDAP laws? Although explaining 
the causes for different enforcement outcomes is an important next step, it is 
not our task here. No one has previously collected comprehensive state and 
federal data on public UDAP enforcement, so we focus in this paper on 
describing the enforcement landscape. 
Across a range of attributes, UDAP enforcement by state and federal 
actors varies while also revealing clear patterns. We organize the data to 
show how enforcers employ distinct strategies. The two main federal enforc-
ers adopt sharply different approaches, especially regarding targets and re-
lief. The state enforcers divide into several groups, distinguished not only by 
these and other case variables, but also by case quantity and leadership in 
multi-enforcer actions. 
In Part II we provide a brief overview of public UDAP enforcement, 
tracing its historical origins and explaining its structural features. We tum in 
Part ill to review the relevant scholarship, locating our subject within a 
broader discussion on civil enforcement. Part IV outlines our study design, 
including our methodology and our rationales for drawing certain lines. In 
the final three parts we tum to the data. Part V summarizes our findings at 
the aggregate level. In Part VI we identify distinct enforcement strategies. 
And, finally, in Part VII we briefly examine the implications of this study for 
conceptions of public enforcement, the exercise of public UDAP authority, 
and further research. 
II. UDAP BASICS 
While its fingerprints are everywhere, the basics of UDAP law are less 
familiar. This Part sketches the rise of UDAP law in America and reviews its 
key marks. 
18 See infra PART IV, METHODOLOGY. 
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A. The Rise of VDAP Law 
UDAP laws are a central component of state and federal consumer pro-
tection law. They arrived as an alternative to common law remedies in tort 
and contract, which proved inadequate for addressing fraud in a progres-
sively more complex marketplace. 19 Congress passed the first UDAP statute 
in 1938, prohibiting "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce"20 
and giving the FfC enforcement power.21 Stakeholders commonly refer to 
the law as "Section 5." Although Congress never empowered the agency to 
enforce the prohibition against banks,22 the FfC has authority over a broad 
range of markets. 
Beginning in the 1960s, states began to adopt similar laws.23 Worries 
about regulatory capture, limited agency capacity, a growing consumer 
movement, and the absence of a private right of action in Section 5 all fueled 
this development. By 1981 every state had a consumer protection act.24 In 
the vast majority of states and the District of Columbia, the attorney general 
has exclusive public enforcement power under the state UDAP, although in a 
few states this authority resides in, or is shared with, another agency.25 Un-
19 Common law remedies included breach of contract, unconscionability, fraud, and fraud-
ulent misrepresentation. For analysis of these remedies and their limits, see Henry N. Butler & 
Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer Protection Acts Really Little-FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. 
REV. 163, 168--69 (2011); Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction 
of Consumer Protection Acts, 54 KAN. L. REV. I, 6--7 (2005); Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust! 
Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at War with Each Other, 121 YALE L.J. 2216, 
2226--27 (2012). 
20 Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, sec. 3, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(I) (2012)). 
21 See 52 Stat. at 111-12 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012)). 
22 For a summary of agency jurisdiction to enforce UDAP against banks, see Mark Totten, 
Credit Reform and the States: The Vital Role of Attorneys General after Dodd-Frank, 99 IOWA 
L. REV. 115, 120 (2013). 
23 See Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of Public Consumer Protec-
tion Law in the United States: Their Effect on Litigation and Enforcement, 24 GA. ST. U. L. 
REv. 663, 674-77 (2008); Butler & Wright, supra note 19, at 167-73 (identifying different 
types of state consumer protection acts); Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 19, at 15-32. 
24 See MARY DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE 
LAW app. 3A (2016) (listing state consumer protection statutes, including date of enactment 
and citation); Butler & Wright, supra note 19, at 169. 
25 Connecticut gives the Commissioner of the Department of Consumer Protection sole 
discretion to bring a UDAP action, although the state's AG litigates cases before the judiciary 
on behalf of the Commissioner. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-1 !0m(a) (West, Westlaw 
through the 2016 Sept. Special Sess.). Although Georgia previously granted the Georgia Of-
fice of Consumer Protection exclusive public enforcement power, the legislature transferred 
that power to the state AG in 2015. See 2015 Ga. Laws 187 (codified at GA. CooE ANN. §§ 10-
1-390-408 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.)) (effective July 1, 2015). Hawaii gives 
the state AG and a separate consumer protection agency concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the 
state UDAP. See HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 480-20(c) (West, Westlaw through Act I (end) of 
the 2016 Second Special Sess.). In practice, the agency handles most UDAP enforcement ac-
tion and the state AG participates in a case-by-case basis. Letter from Deborah Day Demerson, 
Deputy Att'y Gen., State of Haw., to Prentiss Cox, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. 
(July 16, 2015) (on file with authors) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). Utah 
places exclusive public enforcement power in the hands of the Utah Department of Commerce, 
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like Section 5, state UDAP statutes all create a private right of action and 
provide for attorneys' fees for prevailing plaintiffs.26 
Congress expanded federal UDAP enforcement in 2010 with passage of 
the Dodd-Frank Act.27 Among other reforms, Congress created the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau28 and empowered the new agency to en-
force a broad prohibition on "unfair, deceptive, or abusive act[s] or 
practice[s]" ("UDAAP").29 The agency has enforcement power against any 
person or entity that offers or provides a consumer financial product or ser-
vice. 30 While the UDAP language is familiar, Congress included the novel 
term "abusive,"31 which the agency has cautiously applied.32 Moreover, like 
Section 5, the new UDAAP provision lacks a private right of action. 
In sum, UDAP law reflects nearly eighty years of evolution in Ameri-
can consumer protection. At least three distinct UDAP laws cover every con-
sumer today: two federal statutes and at least one state statute. Moreover, as 
discussed below, these laws empower four types of public enforcers: the 
FTC; the CFPB; various state AGs; and, in a few states, a separate consumer 
protection agency.33 
Division of Consumer Protection. See UTAH CooE ANN. § 13-11-3(3) (West, Westlaw through 
2016 Fourth Special Sess.) (defining the "[e]nforcing authority" to mean the "Division of 
Consumer Protection"). Wisconsin is similar to Hawaii. Under the first of two UDAP statutes, 
the state AG and the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection have concur-
rent jurisdiction, with a requirement that the state AG "consult" with the agency before filing a 
judicial complaint. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 100.18(1 l)(a), (d), (e) (West, Westlaw through 2015 
Act 392). This first statute prohibits "untrue, deceptive or misleading" representations. Id. 
§ 100.18(1). Under the second UDAP statute, the agency has full enforcement power, see id. 
§ 100.20(6), and the state AG can file an administrative complaint with the agency and later 
seek judicial review, see id.§ 100.20(4). This second statute prohibits "unfair trade practices." 
See id. § 100.20(1). 
26 See Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, Does Fraud Pay? An Empirical Analy-
sis of Attorney's Fees Provisions in Consumer Fraud Statutes, 56 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 483, 
494-95 (2008). For this and other advantages, see Budnitz, supra note 23, at 674-77; Butler & 
Wright, supra note 19, at 167-73; Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 19, at 15-32. 
27 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
28 See 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2012). 
29 Id. § 5531 (a). For an overview of CFPB enforcement power, see Christopher L. Peter-
son, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Law Enforcement: An Empirical Review, 90 TuL. 
L. REv. 1057, 1064-73 (2016); Totten, supra note 22, at 125-28. 
30 See 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) (2012). For a list of covered financial products and services, 
see id. § 5481(15). 
31 For the statutory definition of "abusive," see id. § 553l(d). 
32 See Peterson, supra note 29, at 1099-1101. Peterson notes that from 2010 to 2015, 
cases alleging "abusive" practices accounted for only 11.5% of the Bureau's docket and only 
I% of total consumer relief. See id. at 1100. 
33 Two other public enforcers have limited power to enforce UDAP laws. Although not 
their primary mission, federal prudential bank regulators can enforce UDAP laws as part of 
their supervisory role. Among depositories with less than $10 billion in assets, the prudential 
regulator retains exclusive enforcement authority. See 12 U.S.C. § 5516(d) (2012). Moreover, 
a few state consumer protection acts grant enforcement power to cities, counties, or district 
attorneys. See Kathleen S. Morris, Expanding Local Enforcement of State and Federal Con-
sumer Protection Laws, 40 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1903, 1906 nn.9-10 (2013). 
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B. The Marks of UDAP Law 
At least four attributes characterize this body of law. First, UDAP laws 
are generally applicable to personal consumer transactions involving prod-
ucts and services. These laws use various terms to designate the covered 
object of consumption, such as "goods," "services," "merchandise,"34 or 
any acts or practices connected to "trade or commerce."35 Most statutes gen-
erously define these terms,36 giving enforcers broad powers to police the 
marketplace. 37 
Second, the central prohibition on unfair and deceptive acts or practices 
reflects the legislative choice of a principle (often called a standard) over a 
rule.38 The fact that UDAP laws give rise to principle-based enforcement is 
central to this study, as explained in Part IV.39 Although "unfair" and "de-
ceptive" are the most recognizable terms, the various laws sometimes use 
related words to indicate the proscribed conduct, including acts or practices 
that are "unconscionable," "untrue," "misleading," "fraudulent," "false," 
"confusing," or "abusive."40 These terms are classic examples of principle-
based norms. 
34 See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 44-1521-22 (2016) (applying UDAP to "merchan-
dise," defined to cover "any objects, wares, goods, commodities, intangibles, real estate or 
services"); OH10 REv. CODE ANN.§ 4165.02 (West 2016) (prohibiting fraud "in the course of 
the person's business, vocation, or occupation" that relates to "goods or services"). 
35 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l) (2012) (prohibiting "unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
in or affecting commerce" (emphasis added)); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.204(1) (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Second Regular Session of the Twenty-Fourth Legislature) (prohibiting "unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce" (emphasis added)); 
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/2 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-906 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.) 
(same). 
36 See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/l(f) (2016) (defining "trade" and 
~'commerce''). 
37 Many of these laws exempt certain areas of the market. See NAT'L CONSUMER LAw 
CTR., UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTs ANo PRACTICES § 2.1.l (8th ed. 2012) [hereinafter 
NCLC, UDAP]. 
38 We use the term principle to describe the type of legislative command that UDAP laws 
represent. Ronald Dworkin introduces a distinction between a principle and a policy as two 
types of standards. He explains: 
I shall call a 'policy' that kind of standard that sets out a goal to be reached, generally 
an improvement in some economic, political, or social feature of the community 
.... I call a 'principle' a standard that is to be observed, not because it will advance 
or secure an economic, political, or social situation deemed desirable, but because it 
is a requirement of justice or fairness of some other dimension of morality. 
Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 14, 22-23 (1967); see also James 
J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, 100 CAUF. L. 
REv. 115 (2012) (applying same distinction). This description of a principle as a broad "re-
quirement of justice or fairness" accurately describes the prohibition at the center of UDAP 
laws. 
39 See infra III.A. I. 
40 See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 8-19-5(27) (2016) (prohibiting "any other unconscionable, false, 
misleading, or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of trade or commerce"); KY. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 367.170 (West 2017) (prohibiting "[u]nfair, false, misleading, or deceptive acts 
or practices," and defining "unfair" to mean "unconscionable"); 73 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. 
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As Louis Kap low explains, the difference between a principle (or what 
he calls a standard) and a rule turns on "the extent to which efforts to give 
content to the law are undertaken before or after individual acts."41 A rule 
identifies specific conduct and leaves the enforcer little discretion as to what 
conduct the law covers. A principle, however, grants broad discretion to the 
enforcer (and ultimately, to the courts). As a result, UDAP enforcers can 
respond to ever-changing practices that may harm consumers, without re-
turning to the legislature every time a new scheme hatches. While this flexi-
bility is critical to consumer protection, principles can incur costs. Broad 
discretion can mean that enforcement of the law is less predictable and con-
sistent, especially when the law empowers multiple enforcers.42 
Understanding a law means understanding how enforcers exercise their 
discretion under that law. With few exceptions, both rules and principles 
leave the enforcer with discretion on whether to enforce. Principles, how-
ever, grant the enforcer considerable discretion on how to enforce. As a re-
sult, while there is always a difference between the "law on the books" and 
the "law in action" (to borrow Roscoe Pound's phrase),43 the difference is 
more pronounced when the law on the books is a principle. As this study 
demonstrates with principle-based UDAP law, enforcer discretion pro-
foundly shapes outcomes. 
Third, all UDAP laws grant public enforcement authority to a particular 
government enforcer. Federal UDAP laws empower the FTC and the CFPB, 
while state UDAP laws typically designate the state attorney general. These 
UDAP enforcers sometimes cooperate with each other,44 although multi-en-
forcer cases account for a relatively small percentage of UDAP actions.45 
States cooperate with other states, and one or more states cooperate with one 
or more federal agencies. 
The UDAP enforcer can engage in pre-complaint discovery using a 
civil investigative demand ("CID").46 Even when a UDAP statute does not 
grant this right, another statute47 or the state's common law may create it.48 
Federal enforcers have a similar power.49 This tool, held by the public but 
not the private enforcer, can prove critical for building a case and reaching a 
§ 201-2(4)(xxi) (West 2016) (defining UDAP to include "any other fraudulent or deceptive 
conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding"). 
41 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L. J. 557, 560 
(1992). 
42 See supra text accompanying note 38. 
43 See generally Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12 
(1910). 
44 See Totten, supra note 1, at 1643-44 (describing the rise of multi-government actions in 
response to the Great Recession). 
45 See infra note 119 and accompanying text. 
46 See NCLC, UDAP, supra note 37, § 13.3. 
47 See, e.g., CAL. Gov'r CooE § 11180 (West 2016). 
48 See, e.g., People v. Crawford Distrib. Co., 291 N.E.2d 648, 656 (Ill. 1972). 
49 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c) (2012) (CFPB Cills); 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2012) (FTC 
"6(b) orders"); 15 U.S.C. § 57b-l (2012) (FTC CIDs). 
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settlement outside of court. Once the public enforcer is ready to proceed, 
UDAP laws typically permit multiple enforcement channels. Public enforc-
ers can negotiate informal pre-complaint agreements, often called assurances 
of voluntary compliance ("A VCs"), which require judicial filing in some 
states and not others. In some cases, public enforcers can conduct formal 
administrative proceedings or issue cease and desist orders. In addition, pub-
lic enforcers sometimes file a judicial complaint and consent judgment si-
multaneously, and sometimes proceed to litigate in a contested matter. 
Fourth, and finally, UDAP laws allow public enforcers to seek multiple 
remedies. This study gives considerable attention to UDAP remedies, which 
accounted for more than 75% of the variables we coded. These remedies fall 
into three types: injunctive relief; public compensation; and government 
money. While, strictly speaking, injunctive relief is a remedy available only 
through the courts, we use the term broadly to mean any relief that prospec-
tively regulates a defendant's conduct, whether issued by a court, an agency, 
or agreed upon in the terms of a settlement or A VC. Injunctive relief can 
take many forms, ranging from prohibiting certain representations to a ban 
on doing business in the jurisdiction. 
Public compensation encompasses any relief provided to harmed con-
sumers. so This relief, sometimes called restitution, includes both payments to 
consumers and non-money relief, such as contract rescission, amendment to 
a credit report, or an agreement to cease debt collection. For purposes of this 
study, injunctive relief aims to prevent future harms, while public compensa-
tion is remedial. Finally, government money includes any money payments 
that do not compensate harmed consumers. This relief can also take many 
forms, including a civil penalty, compensation for fees and costs, or a cy 
pres award, which typically involves the court distributing settlement funds 
to a charity that will advance the interests of the harmed consumers when 
individual compensation is not possible. In some cases, government money 
is imposed but the order or settlement does not designate a specific purpose. 
With slight variations, state and federal enforcers have broad powers to 
mix and match these remedies. The state enforcer can always negotiate any 
type of relief for settlement and the courts generally have broad authority to 
issue an injunction, require public compensation, or impose some form of 
government money.st Outside of settlement negotiations, most state enforc-
5° For a taxonomy of state and federal public compensation schemes, see generally Pren-
tiss Cox, Public Enforcement Compensation and Private Rights, 100 MINN. L. REv. 2313 
(2016). 
51 All state UDAP laws empower courts to grant injunctive relief. See NCLC, UDAP, 
supra note 37, § 13.5.1.1. Likewise, nearly all state UDAP laws permit public compensation. 
See id. § 13.5.4.1. Even if the statute is silent most courts nonetheless grant public compensa-
tion on the basis of their equitable powers. See id. § 13.5.4.1. n. A majority of state UDAP 
laws allow courts to impose civil penalties for initial violations, although some laws require a 
showing of purpose or knowledge. See id. §§ 13.5.3.1, 13.5.3.4. Although not every state 
UDAP law expressly allows for fees, the state can probably seek fees under a general statute. 
See id. 
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ers lack power to impose these forms of relief through an administrative 
process. A minority of states grant the enforcer power to issue cease and 
desist orders52 and a few state enforcers can also require public compensa-
tion outside the courts, with the defendant having a right of judicial review. 53 
Although the FTC can also negotiate settlements with any form of relief, the 
agency's administrative power is limited to injunctive relief through issuing 
an administrative order.54 If the agency wants to compel public compensa-
tion or impose civil fines, it must petition a court. 55 The CFPB can seek all 
three types of relief, whether through an administrative process or through 
the courts.56 
III. SCHOLARSHIP BACKGROUND 
How the government enforces its laws is a critical question for any 
democracy. Legal scholars have long wrestled with theories of enforcement: 
goals, optimal levels, legitimizing principles, and mechanisms to control 
politicization. The wider literature often focuses on criminal enforcement,57 
but we focus on civil enforcement theory and its specific application to dis-
cussions of public enforcement. 
A. Normative Discussion of Public Enforcement 
Although the research in this area is limited, a few normative debates 
have emerged about the role and boundaries of public enforcement. In the 
past few years, there has been an increased focus on the office of the state 
attorney general, the most important public enforcer of consumer protection 
law at the state level.58 The office itself has attracted both its defenders and 
its critics. Margaret Lemos and Max Minzner have questioned the efficiency 
52 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.208 (West 2016). 
53 See, e.g., Mo. CODE ANN., CoM. LAW § 13-403(b)(l)(i) (West 2016). 
54 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2012) (power to issue cease and desist orders). The only appel-
late court to consider whether the FTC has administrative power to order public compensation 
rejected the idea. See Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 323-24 (9th Cir. 1979). 
55 See 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (2012) (empowering judiciary to grant "such relief as the court 
finds necessary"). The court's power to levy a civil fine against non-rule violations of Section 
5 is restricted to violations that occur "with actual knowledge that such act or practice is unfair 
or deceptive and is unlawful." Id. § 45(m)(l)(B)(2). 
56 See 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a)(2) (2012). 
57 See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF 
LAW AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 1-15 (1968). 
58 See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For Profit Public Enforcement, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 853, 854 (2014); see also Margaret H. Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, 
104 GEO. L.J. 515, 548-49 (2016) [hereinafter Lemos, Privatizing]. But see Lemos, Aggre-
gate Litigation, supra note 15, at 512; Lemos, State Enforcement, supra note 16, at 722. For 
supportive examinations, see generally Prentiss Cox, The Importance of Deceptive Practice 
Enforcement in Financial Institution Regulation, 30 PACE L. REv. 279 (2009) [hereinafter, 
Cox, Deceptive Practice Enforcement]; Hensler, supra note 8; Totten, Credit Reform, supra 
note 22. 
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of public enforcement actions through the state attorneys general due to per-
ceived conflicts stemming from enforcer motivations and consequent reme-
dial structures.59 With respect to the perceived remedial functions of public 
enforcement of aggregate claims, there are calls for an expansion to the pub-
lic realm of the many procedural reforms previously applied to the private 
class action.60 Other scholars resist these reforms (1) because such reforms 
do not connect to the actual remedial functions of public enforcement61 and 
(2) due to the structural need to maintain a robust role for public enforcers to 
obtain public compensation on behalf of harmed individuals in light of lim-
ited access to the private class action.62 
Scholarly focus on distribution of enforcement powers goes beyond as-
sessing the enforcement by state attorneys general. Recently, scholars have 
turned toward institutional arguments examining distribution of enforcement 
power within the larger public realm itself. This tum continues to assess 
normatively the efficiency of each enforcement model, and it also brings in 
more contextual and institutional theories focused on accountability and in-
dependence within the federalist system. 
For example, scholars have examined the exercise of concurrent en-
forcement authority between state and federal enforcers, pointing out the 
accountability-forcing mechanisms such concurrent enforcement schemes 
might encourage, as well as other benefits like additional resources and the 
specific knowledge states can bring to enforcement decisions.63 Concurrent 
enforcement of federal law is part of a series of legislative design choices to 
situate an agency within our federalist system. Rachel Barkow proposes 
"equalizing" factors that affect an agency's propensity for capture, which in 
tum can determine levels of enforcement. 64 One of these equalizing factors is 
the agency's enforcement interaction with other agencies, both federal and 
state.65 Barkow writes that "[a] multiple enforcer model with an insulated 
59 See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 58, at 854; see also Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, 
supra note 15, at 512-18; Lemos, Privatizing, supra note 58, at 548-49. 
60 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 16; see also Adam Zimmerman, Distribut-
ing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 500, 555-56 (2011). 
61 See Cox, supra note 50. 
62 See Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC' s 
Fair Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 331-34 (2015). 
63 See Lemos, State Enforcement, supra note 16; Amanda M. Rose, State Enforcement of 
National Policy: A Contextualist Approach (with Evidence from the Securities Realm), 97 
MINN. L. REv. 1343, 1356-59 (2013) [hereinafter Rose, State Enforcement]; Amanda M. 
Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2173, 2204-05 (2010) [hereinafter Rose, Multienforcer]; Totten, supra note 22, at 
122-25; Amy Widman, Advancing Federalism Concerns in Administrative Law Through a 
Revitalization of State Enforcement Powers: A Case Study of the Consumer Product Safety and 
Improvement Act of2008, 29 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 165, 171-72 (2010); Amy Widman & 
Prentiss Cox, State Attorneys General's Use of Concurrent Public Enforcement Authority in 
Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 64 (2011). 
64 Rachel Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture through Institutional Design, 
89 Tux. L. REv. 15, 18 (2010). 
65 See id. at 55-58. 
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agency and state AGs is likely to be more effective than a multiple enforcer 
model involving only federal agencies because the federal agencies are all 
likely to ultimately fall in line with the President's priorities, and those pri-
orities will frequently be dictated by powerful political interest groups."66 
Critics of concurrent enforcement schemes claim that such schemes create 
unpredictability and disunity, as well as creating the possibility for policy 
distortion and less accountability within particular jurisdictions.67 
Beyond the vertical distribution of enforcement powers in our federalist 
system, scholars have also considered the horizontal distribution of enforce-
ment authority. These scholars examine the effects of multiagency and mul-
tistate enforcement.68 Relying on institutional theory to assess understudied 
issues of shared regulatory authority among multiple federal agencies, Cath-
erine Sharkey focuses on the multiagency design of federal consumer pro-
tection regulation and the problems that arise when courts must consider 
deference to agencies that share interpretive authority.69 Sharkey promotes 
greater deference by courts when overlapping agencies coordinate regulatory 
enforcement. 70 Max Minzner also examines the effects of decentralized en-
forcement among multiple specialized agencies and suggests that regulatory 
expertise does not necessarily translate to enforcement expertise.71 Minzner 
proposes that legislatures pay more attention to agency design choice on 
enforcement and argues that centralized civil enforcement in one generalist 
agency might be an optimal design for many specialist agencies.72 
In the wake of the economic crisis, scholars more directly addressed 
UDAP enforcement in consumer financial protection.73 Prentiss Cox explains 
the critical role of UDAP enforcement in heading off economic crises, and 
seeks to promote more robust enforcement of UDAP as a first line of de-
fense. 74 Describing the legal and historical events leading up to the economic 
crisis, Mark Totten expands on assessments of enforcement quality and ar-
gues in support of decentralized approaches to consumer protection enforce-
ment. 75 Raymond Brescia engages in a micro-study of UDAP' s applicability 
to the robo-sign scandal as a component of the larger crisis. 76 Dee Pridgen 
66 Id. at 58. 
67 See Rose, State Enforcement, supra note 63, at 1351-54. 
68 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 64; Max Minzner, Should Agencies Enforce?, 99 MINN. 
L. REv. 2113, 2118-20 (2015); Rose, Multienforcer, supra note 63; Catherine M. Sharkey, 
Agency Coordination in Consumer Protection, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 329, 329-31 (2013). 
69 See Sharkey, supra note 68, at 353-56 (promoting the benefits of a judicial review 
coordination strategy that encourages agencies with overlapping authority to coordinate 
responses). 
70 See id. 
71 See Minzner, supra note 68, at 2121-35. 
72 See id. 
73 See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, Leverage: State Enforcement Actions in the Wake of the 
Robo-Sign Scandal, 64 ME. L. REv. 17, 18 (2011); Cox, Deceptive Practice Enforcement, 
supra note 58, at 279; Totten, supra note 1, at 1611. 
74 See Cox, Deceptive Practice Enforcement, supra note 58, at 279. 
75 See Totten, supra note 1, at 1611. 
76 See Brescia, supra note 73, at 18. 
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evaluates the gaps in federal UDAP enforcement and explains how the 
CFPB's structure and UDAP enforcement authority is designed to fill in 
those gaps. 77 
B. Descriptive Discussions of Public Enforcement 
The dominant literature debating enforcement uses an economic ap-
proach focused primarily on efficiency, and thus seeks to answer normative 
questions about the optimal quantity of enforcement.78 Recently, however, 
the almost universal economic view of enforcement as driven primarily by a 
question of optimal quantity may be giving way to new questions addressing 
quality and texture of enforcement.79 Scholars' empirical analysis of enforce-
ment, institutional understandings of enforcement, and legitimizing theories 
for public enforcement80 are all examples of scholars beginning to think 
about enforcement quality and relationships, rather than merely quantity. Be-
yond asking questions tied to efficiency, these scholars are thinking about 
enforcement behaviorally, and within a pragmatic context.81 What does en-
forcement look like and how are the actors in a decentralized enforcement 
scheme interacting? For example, David Engstrom maps the different "path-
ways" that private enforcement can take and, in so doing, captures more 
distinctions of private enforcement.82 
These empirically-based studies have examined enforcement with an 
eye toward capturing a more descriptive, and thus more contextual, assess-
ment. Contextual empirical work shifts the debate about enforcement from 
an abstract one-size-fits-all discussion to a nuanced understanding of how 
enforcement looks in particular situations. Ideally, these descriptions can 
ground normative theories in an understanding of current practice. 
77 See Dee Pridgen, Sea Changes in Consumer Financial Protection: Stronger Agency and 
Stronger Laws, 13 Wvo. L. REv. 405, 407 (2013). 
78 See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. PoL. 
EcoN. 169, 170 (1968). 
79 See Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New 
World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 61 (2009). 
80 See Margaret H. Lemos, Democratic Enforcement? Accountability and Independence 
for the Litigation State, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 929, 929-30 (2017); Velikonja, supra note 62, 
at 331. 
81 See Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 79, at 107; see also David Engstrom, Harnessing the 
Private Attorney General: Evidence for Qui Tam Litigation, 112 Cot.UM. L. REV. 1244, 1256 
(2012) (using empirical analysis of a particular private-public enforcement scheme to show 
that "an alternative to the above approaches to rationalizing private enforcement regimes fo-
cuses less on litigation quantity and more on its quality by shaping the identities and capacities 
of the private enforcers themselves"). 
82 See Engstrom, supra note 81, at 1325 ("[C]laims about the virtues and vices of private 
enforcement--claims that echo across a range of regulatory regimes that deploy private litiga-
tion as a policy tool--cannot be understood solely by reference to the actions of decentralized, 
profit-motivated litigants. Rather, the challenges of deploying private enforcement as a regula-
tory tool begin well upstream and are endemic to delegation itself."). 
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Before turning to the scholarship on public UDAP enforcement, we 
pause to examine recent studies of securities enforcement that ask these sorts 
of contextual questions. James Park's examination of the decentralized land-
scape of SEC enforcement is indicative of the critical turn toward a richly 
descriptive assessment.s3 Park argues that existing normative analysis in the 
securities realm skews the discussion toward net efficiency without allowing 
for variations among enforcers in a multi-enforcer, decentralized land-
scape. 84 In other words, Park argues, when assessing enforcement outcomes, 
the quality of enforcement is more important than the quantity.ss Therefore, 
Park argues, the economic-based enforcement scholarship has left a gap by 
focusing on efficiency only.s6 Moreover, Park points out that securities law 
(like consumer protection law) is not only decentralized by the enforcer, but 
is also an amalgam of rules and principles. s7 When a system has multiple 
enforcers and multiple schemes (along the rules versus principles spectrum), 
Park argues that any assessment of enforcement must include assessing the 
quality of enforcement and that requires understanding the substantive dif-
ferences between legislative delegations.ss Park concludes by stating, 
It is with principle-enforcement that we see the greatest variation 
in enforcement. The need for predictability and consistency can 
conflict with a desire to punish conduct that runs afoul of public 
value .... The key to defining an optimal system lies in under-
standing the dynamics of principle-enforcement and recognizing 
the benefits of multiple enforcers, while crafting a system that bet-
ter defines the boundaries within which securities enforcers 
operate.s9 
Amanda Rose and Urska Velikonja echo this textural approach to under-
standing enforcement in the securities arena.90 The empirical scholarship on 
83 See Park, supra note 38, at 115-16. 
84 See id. at 118 ("The tendency in the literature surrounding this debate, which relies 
heavily on economic theories of enforcement, has been to focus on whether the right amount 
of enforcement is produced, without drawing distinctions between types of enforcement cases. 
The limit of this approach is the absence of a meaningful way of determining what level of 
enforcement is optimal."). 
85 See id. 
86 See id.; see also Dana Muir, Decentralized Enforcement to Combat Financial Wrongdo-
ing in Pensions: What Types of Watchdogs are Necessary to Keep the Foxes out of the 
Henhouse, 53 AM. Bus. L.J. 33, 37 (2016) (applying Park's "values-based" analysis to pension 
law enforcement). 
87 See Park, supra note 38, at 115. 
88 See id. at 143 ("Finally, some enforcers may go through the motions of enforcing prin-
ciples but in a way that treats principle violations as akin to rule violations that only merit 
nominal sanctions. While technically enforcing the principle, without significant sanctions, the 
action can be dismissed as a relatively trivial administrative cost. Even though such an en-
forcer is technically enforcing a principle, it cannot be considered a true enforcer of 
principles."). 
89 Id. at 181. 
90 See Rose, State Enforcement, supra note 63, at 1344; Velikonja, supra note 80, at 331. 
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public enforcement of consumer protection law in general, or UDAP laws in 
particular, is even more limited. 91 The main areas of empirical scholarship 
are focused on state attorney general participation in multistate lawsuits,92 
state enforcement of federal consumer protection law,93 and agency-specific 
studies of enforcement.94 
In a series of empirically-based articles, Colin Provost examines the 
role of multistate litigation as an enforcement choice among state attorneys 
general.95 His data reveal a multistate enforcement model that is responsive 
to the electorate and effective in cases of severe infractions.% Paul Nolette is 
more critical of these types of coordinated litigation actions by state attor-
neys general.97 Nolette relies on a dataset of all "coordinated AG litigation" 
that took place between 1980 and 2013.98 Nolette concludes that coordinated 
litigation has grown over time, in both quantity and quality, and he warns 
that this type of activity can go beyond influencing a lax federal enforcement 
system and instead can "dictate the terms of national policy ."99 This, Nolette 
argues, upsets the federalism balance. 100 Amy Widman and Prentiss Cox em-
pirically examine claims about concurrent enforcement strategies, specifi-
cally how states enforce federal consumer protection law. 101 Their findings 
"strongly suggest that fears about over-enforcement or inconsistent enforce-
ment by the states have not been realized in actual practice." 102 
Descriptive studies of agency enforcement are by nature contextual and 
this type of work provides important contributions to greater understanding 
of the quality of enforcement of consumer protection. 103 Christopher Peter-
91 This section focuses on empirical studies of public enforcement, but we note recent 
empirical work examining private enforcement of consumer protection law as well. See, e.g., 
JOSHUA D. WRIGHT ET AL., SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST.: STATE CONSUMER PROT. ACTS TASK 
fuRCE, STA·m CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS: AN EMPIRICAL lNVESTIGATION OF PRIVATE LITI-
GATION: PRELIMINARY REPORT, DECEMBER 2009 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1708175 
[https://perma.cc/7Y2X-MTH3]; Stephen Meili, Collective Justice of Personal Gain? An Em-
pirical Analysis of Consumer Class Action Lawyers and Named Plaintiffs, 44 AKRON L. REV. 
67 (2011) (analyzing qualitative data on the motivations of named plaintiffs and class action 
lawyers in consumer class actions). 
92 See, e.g., NOLE"ITE, supra note 5; Colin L. Provost, An Integrated Model of U.S. State 
AG Behavior in Multi-State Litigation, 10 ST. PoL. & Prn.'Y Q. I (2010); Provost, Entrepre-
neurship, supra note 5; Provost, Politics, supra note 5. 
93 See, e.g., Widman & Cox, supra note 63. 
94 See, e.g., Maureen K. Olhausen, Administrative Litigation at the FTC: Effective Tool for 
Developing the Law or Rubber Stamp?, 12 J. COMPETITION L. & EcoN. 623, 625-28 (2016); 
Peterson, supra note 29. 
95 See Provost, Politics, supra note 5; Provost, Entrepreneurship, supra note 5. 
96 See Provost, Politics, supra note 5; Provost, Entrepreneurship, supra note 5. 
97 See NoLEITE, supra note 5. 
98 See id. at 21 (using data including antitrust, consumer protection, health care, and envi-
ronmental litigation, broadly defined). 
99 Id. at 2. 
100 See generally id. 
wi See Widman & Cox, supra note 63, at 53-55. 
102 Id. at 55. 
103 See, e.g., Olhausen, supra note 94, at 625-28 (conducting a review of administrative 
actions brought by the FTC to determine whether criticisms of being a "kangaroo court" are 
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son recently examined all CFPB enforcement actions between 2011 and 
2015. 104 Peterson's study included all publicly announced enforcement ac-
tions (as opposed to focusing on the enforcement of the general UDAAP 
prohibition only). 105 Overall, Peterson's data reveal an investigative, collabo-
rative, and efficient agency. 106 Moreover, within the time period he studied, 
all of the enforcement actions were uncontested and the controversial "abu-
sive" standard was cautiously enforced. 107 Peterson's findings fill an impor-
tant gap in understanding the quality of enforcement at this new agency, and 
many of his findings are contrary to claims made by those critical of the 
agency.1os 
Beyond these studies, however, the landscape is barren. Reviewing re-
cent research in the area of consumer protection law, Stephen Meili la-
mented the lack of empirical work and concluded that "[t]his imbalance is 
both surprising and troubling, given that it is in the interests of all consum-
ers, and society generally, for cash-strapped regulators to enforce the law as 
effectively and efficiently as possible." 109 Other scholars have openly called 
for empirical investigation of public enforcement of consumer protection 
law, especially given the important normative debates that lack empirical 
background. 110 This project aims to fill that void. 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
This Part explains the study design, including the scope of the cases 
studied, the methods of collecting case documents and data, the identity of 
the public enforcers, and the limitations imposed by the methodology. 
A. Scope of Cases Studied 
We collected and analyzed cases by a federal or state public enforce-
ment entity ("enforcer") alleging violations of a principle-based UDAP stat-
upheld by the data and finding that the criticisms are not supported); Peterson, supra note 29, 
at l 063--64. 
104 See Peterson, supra note 29, at 1106-12. 
105 See id. 
106 See id. 
107 See id. 
108 See id. at 1104 ("The data reported in this Article should serve as an analytical bench-
mark against which future Bureau action can be measured and as a needle to deflate the ab-
surdly overheated political rhetoric used to grandstand against the CFPB's mission and 
accomplishments. Vapid allegations that the new consumer protection agency is a 'Franken-
stein monster,' based on 'the Stalin model,' or taking the first steps toward 'socialism' are 
thoughtlessly untethered from reality." (internal citations omitted)). 
109 See Stephen Meili, Consumer Protection, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL RESEARCH 176, 187 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010). 
"
0 Deborah Hensler criticized Margaret Lemos's article, Aggregate Litigation Goes Pub-
lic, saying her analysis is "heavy on theory and light on empirics-indeed, her article does not 
contain any empirical data about the nature and frequency of the litigation that concerns her." 
See Hensler, supra note 8, at 58. 
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ute resolved during the calendar year 2014. Cases were deemed to have been 
resolved in 2014 based on the date the final order was filed with the court or 
administrative agency, or on the latest date of execution by any party to a 
settlement agreement. 111 This subpart describes cases determined within the 
scope of the study with respect to two concerns: (1) which cases alleged 
principle-based UDAP violations; and (2) which cases were resolved in 
2014, including cases with multiple resolving documents. 
1. Public Enforcers and Principle-Based UDAP Statutes 
We limited our study to enforcement of principles enunciated in UDAP 
laws rather than rule-based consumer protection. As discussed above, princi-
ple-based enforcement occurs where the legislature has provided a broad 
standard, and that standard is not tied to particular policy goals but rather 
broad norms, like fairness. This type of delegation, by its nature, is a con-
scious choice of the legislature to rely substantially on the enforcer's discre-
tion. Our aim is to provide a snapshot of how UDAP enforcers use their 
discretion and to provide a typology of enforcement strategies. 
All UDAP cases resolved by federal enforcers expressly identified that 
the enforcer was claiming a violation of either the unfair, deceptive, or abu-
sive principles in the UDAP law. Therefore, every case by the FfC or CFPB 
alleging a UDAP violation was within the scope of the study because it in-
cluded a principle-based UDAP claim. 
UDAP claims by state enforcers were not always as clearly delineated 
as the principle-based claims. In two types of cases, state enforcement nomi-
nally pursued under a UDAP statute constitutes a rule-based action. First, 
some rule-based state consumer protection laws identify a violation of that 
Jaw as a per se violation of the state UDAP as a means to provide enforce-
ment remedies. For example, a failure to license or register a business can be 
a per se violation of a state UDAP law. 112 Second, some UDAP statutes go 
beyond an elaboration of UDAP principles and include rule-based provi-
sions. For example, the Oregon UDAP statute contains extensive rule provi-
sions, such as prohibiting the sale of "a motor vehicle manufactured after 
January 1, 2006, that contains mercury light switches." 113 Most cases that 
presented rule-based applications of a UDAP statute were patent, but a few 
required judgment calls. In these instances, all three researchers evaluated 
the case documents and reached consensus on whether to include the case. 
111 For cases brought as a joint action by two or more enforcers, which we refer to as 
multi-enforcer cases, we modified the last date rule to be the year in which a majority of the 
participating states filed or executed the common settlement. 
112 See, e.g., ARK. CoDE ANN.§ 4-28-416 (West 2017) (failure to register as a charity is a 
per se violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act). 
113 See OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 646.608(l)(z) (West 2016). 
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2. Resolved Cases 
We measured resolution at the trial or administrative level without re-
gard to appeal, although we tracked the outcomes of appeals in contested 
cases. When cases with more than one defendant resulted in more than one 
resolving document, we treated each resolving document as a separate case 
only if the resolving document met one of the following criteria: (1) it was a 
judicial proceeding with a final judgment under Rule 54(b ); (2) it was an 
administrative proceeding that produced an order using the same principles 
as Rule 54(b ); or (3) it was an assurance of voluntary compliance, which is a 
unique form of pre-complaint settlement available to state attorneys general 
by statute in most states. 114 Otherwise, we determined that a case with multi-
ple resolving documents was in scope if the last order or settlement resolv-
ing all issues of liability and remedies occurred during 2014. 
B. Data Collection and Coding 
For each case within the study scope, we attempted to collect a resolv-
ing document, such as a final order or final settlement. When available, we 
also collected an initiating document, such as a judicial or administrative 
complaint. We obtained these documents through online searches of enforcer 
websites and electronic case data repositories, government open record re-
quests, and direct requests to specific government officials. The FTC and the 
CFPB post all resolved enforcement actions on their websites. 115 
State enforcers do not routinely post on their websites copies of docu-
ments from resolved UDAP enforcement actions, although at least seven 
states make all or most of their UDAP enforcement actions available for 
download. 116 We sent requests under state open records laws to all state at-
torneys general, including the District of Columbia, and five state consumer 
agencies. 117 We obtained a 100% response rate with these requests. 118 Finally, 
114 See supra part Il.B.; see also Cox, supra note 50, at 2355 n.213 (2016). 
115 See Cases & Proceedings, U.S. FED. TRADE CoMM'N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforce-
ment/cases-proceedings [https://perma.cc/F6MJ-KHFW] (providing a database with "[a]ll 
FTC cases & proceedings" and noting that more recent cases "can be filtered by name and 
date."); Enforcement Actions, U.S. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http:// 
www .consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/enforcement/actions [https://perma.cc/S5WY -
XQAK] ("When we take an enforcement action against an entity or person we believe has 
violated the law, we will post court documents and other related materials here."). The CFPB 
also confirmed its 2014 cases through an informal information request. Email from Delicia 
Hand, Staff Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, to Prentiss Cox, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of 
Minn. Sch. of Law (July 23, 2015, 3:19 PM) (on file with author) (on file with the Harvard 
Law School Library). 
116 Colorado, Kansas, Maryland and Wyoming post resolving documents online for most 
of their 2014 UDAP cases. Idaho, New Jersey and Vermont made all of their 2014 UDAP 
enforcement actions available online. 
117 The state open records law requests sought the following documents: "(a) any action 
by [name of the enforcer] to enforce a violation or alleged violation of [name of state UDAP 
law], or any similar UDAP law of [name of state] that authorizes your office to bring actions 
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we sent informal requests to specific government officials for ancillary data 
related to specific cases, such as missing exhibits from orders, and to iden-
tity state leadership in multistate cases. 
Figure 1 breaks down these cases by the type of enforcer alleging 
UDAP violations. We identified a total of 798 cases within the scope of the 
study. State enforcers brought a total of 671 cases when only one state was 
the enforcer, which we label as "individual state" cases. 119 The FTC brought 
ninety-four in-scope cases and the CFPB brought ten cases, for a total of 104 
cases identified as "individual federal" cases in Figure 1. Finally, twenty-
three cases were "multi-enforcer" actions, meaning they were cases brought 
as a joint action by two or more enforcers from different jurisdictions, with 
the noted various combinations of federal and state enforcers. 
104 
FEDERAL 
FIG. 1. NUMBER OF CASES BY ENFORCER TYPE [NOT TO SCALE] 
For each case, we coded 147 fields of data about the allegations made 
in the case and the relief obtained. All of this data derived from the face of 
under statutes commonly known as consumer fraud or UDAP (unfair or deceptive acts and 
practices) laws, but not actions under these laws limited solely to antitrust or unfair competi-
tion claims; (b) for which a Final Order or other similar document was issued, or an Assur-
ance, Consent Judgment or other form of final settlement was issued or obtained; and (c) that 
Final Order, Consent Judgment, Assurance or other similar document was obtained or issued 
during calendar year 2014 (January 1, 2014 through December 31, 2014)." 
118 The following states were particularly noteworthy for timely and clear communication 
and production regarding our requests for a large number of documents: Connecticut, Florida, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, and Oregon. Although some states made 
it difficult to obtain requested records, the authors mostly encountered cooperation with their 
often onerous requests for production of state records, and they are grateful for the diligence 
and professionalism of the staff attorneys handling these requests. 
119 In ten individual state cases a state agency other than an attorney general or administra-
tive agency joined the state UDAP enforcer in the action, including eight cases brought jointly 
by the Colorado Attorney General and the Colorado Uniform Credit Code Administrator. 
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the resolving document and, when available, the initiating document. All 
three researchers coded cases. Multiple test coding occurred to ensure the 
reliability of the process. After reducing variability among researchers, we 
evenly divided the cases for coding. To ensure uniformity of coding and 
prevent drift of coding over time, two researchers periodically blind-coded 
cases and compared results. We resolved discrepancies and discussed differ-
ences. These coding checks occurred with greater frequency at the beginning 
of the coding process, but continued until the end. On key coding variables 
reported here, including form of resolution, type of relief, and dollar 
amounts of relief, variance was minimal. 
The cases included 1802 defendants in the 798 cases studied, or an 
average of 2.25 defendants per case. Entity defendants were more common 
than individual defendants, with actions against 1045 entities and 757 indi-
viduals. In addition to deriving information about defendants from the face 
of the collected documents, we searched databases for additional data about 
entity defendants. The Mergent Intellect database current in 2016 provided 
information for 653, or 62.5% of all entity defendants. For 311 entities, or 
29.8% of the entity defendants, we identified defendant data from the Lexis 
"Company Profiles" multi-source database, including information from Ex-
perian through Lexis, and by searching state government websites contain-
ing corporation information for the state in which the entity was 
incorporated. We were unable to identify any external data on 81 entities, or 
7.8% of all entity defendants. 
These external databases provided six fields of data about each entity .120 
We used two of the fields-number of employees and annual revenue-to 
categorize the defendants by size in Parts V and VI. Of the 1045 entity 
defendants, we identified database information for one or both of these fields 
for 766 of these entities, or 73.3% of the defendants. For the 279 defendants 
with no size data, we determined that 100 of these entities, or 9.7% of all 
defendant entities, had their corporate status either revoked or dissolved in 
their state of incorporation. 
C. Public UDAP Enforcers 
Two concerns arose in compiling the data by enforcer. First, five states 
authorize an administrative agency to enforce their UDAP laws in addition 
to or instead of the state attorney general. 121 In three of those states-Geor-
gia, Hawaii, and Utah-the state attorney general did not bring any UDAP 
cases. Therefore, our reference to enforcers in these states is to the adminis-
trative agency. In Connecticut, the agency has sole discretion to bring a 
120 The following data was collected from external databases on each entity defendant, 
when available: public or private company, subsidiary status, minority owned, NAICS code, 
number of employees at all sites, and annual revenue. 
121 See supra note 33. 
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UDAP case, although the state attorney general litigates the case. In Wiscon-
sin, the Attorney General has independent authority to bring a UDAP case, 
but brought cases during 2014 only as an attorney for the administrative 
agency. For purposes of this study, we treat the agency and the state attorney 
general as one enforcer in these two states. 122 Because we considered the 
District of Columbia to be a state and treated states with an administrative 
agency as having only one enforcer, the data on states are reported for fifty-
one enforcers. 
Second, we divided cases in which multiple enforcers joined into small 
multi-enforcer actions and large multi-enforcer actions. Small multi-enforcer 
actions include either one federal and one state enforcer, or a group of up to 
twenty state enforcers, with or without a federal enforcer. These cases divide 
into the following two groups: 123 
1. Joint Federal-State. In ten cases, a federal enforcer, typically the 
FTC, paired with up to three states. The FTC joined only with Con-
necticut in three actions and only with Florida in three actions. The 
FTC joined with two states in two cases: once with Illinois and 
New York, and once with Illinois and Ohio. The FTC paired with 
three states-Illinois, North Carolina and Kentucky-in one case. 
The CFPB joined with two states, North Carolina and Virginia, in 
one case. In addition to these ten cases, the CFPB joined with thir-
teen states to pursue Colfax Capital Corporation and related entities 
in a bankruptcy proceeding following enforcement actions by the 
states. 
2. Multi-state Only. In five cases, no federal enforcer participated. 
Only two states joined in two cases, but the remaining three cases 
involved a larger number of states (six, nine, and twenty, 
respectively). 
Large multi-enforcer actions involved forty-two or more states joining 
in an action, often with a federal enforcer. These cases divide into the fol-
lowing three categories: 
1. NMS. Two cases were part of the National Mortgage Settlement 
(NMS) cases. 124 The CFPB and fifty states joined in these two cases 
against large mortgage servicing entities resolved in 2014. 125 
122 See supra note 25. 
123 The one case outside this categorization was an unusual action in which the CFPB and 
thirteen states joined to protect their common interests against a group of defendants in a 
bankruptcy proceeding. See Settlement Agreement between Paul J. Mansdorf, Trustee of the 
Estate of Colfax Capital Corp., the CFPB & Thirteen States, In Re Colfax Capital Corp., No. 
08-45902 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 10, 2014). 
124 See supra note 4. 
125 Only Oklahoma did not participate in this settlement. The U.S. Department of Justice 
joined one of these settlements. 
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2. Telecom Cases. Two cases were against telecommunications com-
panies for unauthorized charges on cell phone bills. All fifty-one 
states joined the FfC and the FCC in these cases. 
3. Multi-State Only. In three cases, groups of forty-two to forty-six 
states joined without a federal enforcer. Two of these cases were 
against pharmaceutical companies; the other case was against a sat-
ellite radio company. 
D. Study Limitations 
As with any empirical study, our methodology results in limitations im-
posed by the design of the study. One limitation is that we collected data 
only on cases resolved in one calendar year, 2014, even though many of 
those cases were initiated in years prior to 2014. We obtained a substantial 
number of cases for one year of enforcement, but it may result in problems 
from "small n" assessments when the data is applied at the level of individ-
ual enforcers with a smaller number of cases. For example, if a state attorney 
general had two UDAP cases in 2014, it may be that the same enforcer had 
no cases or five cases the previous or following year. The study also has 
jurisdictional limits. We examined federal and state actions, but not local 
public enforcement of UDAP law. California, in particular, has active en-
forcement of UDAP laws by local government entities. 126 
Moreover, our study looks only at principle-based UDAP enforcement, 
not all consumer protection public enforcement. Enforcers with UDAP au-
thority could use non-UDAP consumer protection laws differently, quantita-
tively or qualitatively. However, we included in the database all cases with a 
single UDAP claim, even if non-UDAP claims predominated. 127 In 55.3% of 
cases enforcers asserted both types of claims, although this percentage va-
ried by enforcer. 128 In addition, we identified state cases through a combina-
tion of means, but relied heavily on government open record requests for 
these cases, and thus the study's state case repository depended substantially 
on the accuracy of the open records responses. 
Similarly, the data on entity defendants from external databases is lim-
ited in two ways. First, this data reflects the accuracy and reach of the exter-
nal databases. Second, we collected this data during 2016 about cases 
resolved in 2014. One possible result is that an enforcement action might 
have substantially reduced the size of a company from 2014 to 2016. 
126 Kathleen C. Engel, local Governments and Risky Home loans, 69 SMU L. REV. 609, 
620 (2016). 
127 We adjudged non-UDAP claims as primary in 53 of the 671 state cases, or 7.9%. 
128 See infra note 140 and accompanying text. 
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TABLE 1. Entity defendant size data by enforcer 
Entities (#) Entities Entities Mean Median Mean Median 
with dissolved entity def. entity def. entity def. entity def. 
known or annual rev. annual rev. employees employees 
size (#) unknown (millions (millions (#) (#) 
size (%) of$) of$) 
States 789 596 24.5 2,053 0.46 6,670 5 
FTC 184 122 33.7 3,029 2 2,253 15 
CFPB 13 13 0.0 696 152 23,468 3,165 
Multi-small 51 27 47.1 286 1 266 5 
Multi-large 8 8 0.0 6,854 2,961 13,744 7,888 
State enforcers routinely brought cases against small entity defendants, 
but the high mean suggests a number of cases against very large defendants. 
To better measure the range of defendant types and size in state cases, we 
excluded defendants with no known size data and then grouped state case 
defendants by the largest defendant in the action. We then determined quar-
tiles and the 90% level for the median number of employees and median 
annual revenue of state entity defendants, and used these breakpoints to de-
termine five categories for state case entity defendant size, as identified in 
Table 2. 
TABLE 2. Explanation of defendant size measures for state enforcers 
Employees (#) Annual revenue ($) 
Tiny entity <3 and < 151,000 
Small entity 3-5 or 151,000 - 592,000 
Medium entity 6-44 or 592,001 - 7,557,500 
Large entity 45-400 or 7,557,500 - 166,380,000 
Mega entity > 400 or > 166,380,000 
For each case, we isolated the defendant in the case that was in the 
largest size category. 130 Table 3 shows the resulting distribution of state 
cases: 
130 When a defendant fell into different quartiles for employee numbers and for annual 
revenue, we used the higher measure to determine the largest defendant in the case. 
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TABLE 3. Frequency of state enforcer cases by largest size entity 
defendant in each case 
No entity defendant 




































That state enforcers pursue smaller targets should not surprise, but the 
exceedingly small size of many such defendants is noteworthy. Over half of 
state enforcer UDAP cases, 51.2%, are either against individuals only or had 
a largest defendant entity with less than $592,000 in annual revenue or no 
more than 6 employees. That percentage rises to 64.2% when including enti-
ties now dissolved or for which no data was available. For comparison, a 
single-location children's bookstore near the home of one of the researchers 
easily exceeds both these annual revenue and employee size measures. 
Finally, we looked at the location of defendants in state cases to deter-
mine how often state enforcers brought cases against in-state defendants. We 
were able to locate data on defendant location for 747 entities, or 94.7% of 
entity defendants, and 446 individuals, or 69.5% of individual defendants. 131 
When the defendant's location was known, 66.1 % of entity defendants and 
59.7% of individual defendants resided in the same state as the enforcer. 
B. Prosecution and Resolution of Cases 
Like most civil litigation, public UDAP enforcement actions mostly set-
tle.132 Unlike most civil litigation, the prevailing party is rarely in doubt. 
131 Principal place of business (PPB) was used to identify location for entities, when that 
information was known; if unknown, we used state of incorporation. Of the 747 entities with 
known location, 673 (90.1 % ) were determined by entity PPB. 
132 See LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTJCE, OFFICE OF JusTICE 
PROGRAMS, CrvrL BENCH AND JURY ThIALS TN STATE CouRTS, 2005, at 1 (2008), https:// 
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SYG-J5UM] ("Among jurisdic-
tions that provided totals for both trial and non-trial general civil dispositions in 2005, trials 
collectively accounted for about 3% of all tort, contract, and real property dispositions in 
general jurisdiction courts."). However, empirical studies distinguishing non-tried cases that 
settle from those decided by dispositive motion are slender. A study of Hawaii state court 
cases in 1996 and 2007 found relatively low settlement rates, reporting that in 2007 settlement 
occurred in 70% of all cases, with tort cases settling more frequently (88%) and foreclosure 
cases least frequently (47%). See John Barkai & Elizabeth Kent, Let's Stop Spreading Rumors 
About Settlement and Litigation: A Comparative Study of Settlement and Litigation in Hawaii 
Courts, 29 OHIO ST. J. D1sP. RESOL. 85, 109 (2014) (also observing that these findings are 
consistent with the few other studies examining settlement rates). 
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Defendants prevailed in only one contested case. This subpart presents data 
from our study on the form of case resolution, the duration of litigation and 
the use of outside counsel by state enforcers. 
All of the CFPB and multi-enforcer actions completed in 2014 were 
settlements. The FTC and the state enforcers completed an almost identical 
percentage of cases through contested resolution. The FTC resolved four 
cases through judicial contest-two by trial and two by dispositive motion-
which represented 4.3% of all FTC cases. Similarly, state enforcers resolved 
twenty-eight cases, or 3.7% of all cases, through a contested process. Almost 
two-thirds of these contested cases were resolved by dispositive motion. Six 
cases were decided by judicial trials and four by administrative hearing. 133 
Of the thirty-two FTC and state cases decided by a contested decision, de-
fendants prevailed in one state court bench trial. 134 In all other cases, the 
UDAP enforcer prevailed. No defendant successfully appealed in any of 
these contested cases. 135 
Overall, state enforcers resolved 104 cases by default, or 15.5% of the 
total number of cases. But eleven state enforcers, each of which is described 
in Part VI as employing a particular type of enforcement strategy, accounted 
for eighty-two, or 78.9%, of these default cases. The rate of default cases for 
the other forty-one state enforcers was 6.6%. The FTC default rate, six cases 
(6.4%), was almost identical to the rate for these state enforcers. These latter 
default rates are almost identical to estimated default rates in general civil 
litigation. 136 
Enforcers often engaged in litigation prior to resolution, as measured by 
the period between filing the initiating document and finalizing a settlement. 
It is difficult to measure definitively the duration of litigation in public 
UDAP enforcement because these enforcers have authority to obtain discov-
ery prior to filing a complaint. 137 This pre-complaint discovery authority 
133 All but one of the judicial trials were bench trials. The State of Wisconsin brought one 
case that was decided, in part, by a jury trial resulting in a special verdict. See Judgment, 
Wisconsin v. Going Places Travel Corp., Nos. 2010-CX-l-lD and lG-11 (Wis. Outgamie Cty. 
Cir. Ct. July 7, 2014). 
134 The one contested loss by an enforcer was a case brought by the Indiana Attorney 
General. Indiana alleged a UDAP violation for a deceptive affiliation claim against an out of 
state company soliciting by mail under the names "Local Records Office" and "National 
Profile Document." See Indiana v. Juan Robert Romero Ascencio, No. 82C01-1305-PL-240 
(Ind. Vanderburgh Cty. Cir. Ct. Oct. 13, 2014). 
135 None of the four FfC cases were appealed. Of the twenty-eight state cases in which the 
state enforcer prevailed, five cases were appealed, and the state prevailed as to liability in all 
cases. People v. Wunder, 371 P.3d 785 (Colo. App. 2016) (affirming summary judgment for 
state and remanding for further proceedings as to remedies); Law v. State, 163 So.3d 1196 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (appeal dismissed); State v. Dailey, 192 Wash. App. 1007 (Ct. App. 
2016) (unpublished table decision) (lower court decision affirmed); State v. Going Places 
Travel Corp., 864 N.W.2d 885 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015) (lower court judgment affirmed); State v. 
Nelson Gamble & Assoc., No. 14AP-280 (Ohio Ct. App. July 17, 2014) (appeal dismissed). 
136 See Barkai & Kent, supra note 132, at 111 (finding a 6% default rate in all cases in 
study of Hawaii state court civil cases). 
137 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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private actions in settlement documents, but the data revealed no case where 
public and private enforcers joined as plaintiffs. 
C. Matters and Claims 
In this subpart, we present data on the goods or services at issue in 
public UDAP enforcement actions, the claims alleged by the enforcers (in-
cluding both UDAP claims and, when joined to a UDAP claim, non-UDAP 
claims), and the sales channels that defendants used. We gathered data on 
the type of product at issue in a case in two ways-by categorizing the 
products described in the documents and by collecting information on the 
industry code of the entity defendants. We also gathered types of claims 
brought by enforcers in two ways-by categorizing the UDAP violations 
and by identifying the statute, rule, or other law violation alleged for non-
UDAP claims joined to the UDAP claims. Finally, in many cases we identi-
fied a primary sales channel used by the defendants. 
This data suggests that UDAP enforcers have a propensity for specializ-
ing in certain types of cases, at least in a given year. For the CFPB, this 
specialization is mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act. It brought cases only 
against sellers of credit or banking products, and joined only non-UDAP 
claims under federal consumer financial protection laws. 140 Unsurprisingly, 
large multi-enforcer actions involved products in industries dominated by 
large companies, with pharmaceuticals, mortgage origination and servicing, 
and telecommunications accounting for six of the seven cases. 
State enforcers and the FTC had distinct patterns as to products, indus-
tries, and claims. 141 Cases against motor vehicle dealers were frequent for 
both types of enforcers, although to some extent they pursued different types 
of claims against these defendants. 142 Table 4 shows the ten most common 
categories of products at issue in cases brought by state enforcers and the 
five most common categories of products in FTC cases. State enforcer top 
categories are identified in blue; FTC top categories are identified in orange; 
and common top categories are identified in red. The percentage represents 
the share for that product compared to all product categories identified for 
that type of enforcer. 143 
140 The CFPB brought non-UDAP claims in six cases, including two cases with claims 
under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (2012), and two 
cases with claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 168lx (2012). 
141 Small multi-enforcer actions involved a diversity of products and claims that reflected 
the approach of state enforcers and the FfC. 
142 The FfC brought almost exclusively price deception claims against motor vehicle deal-
ers (eleven of twelve UDAP claims), and the sales channel for the price deception was typi-
cally the internet (five of eight cases in which the sales channel was identifiable). The FTC 
also used the Consumer Leasing Act (CLA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667, 1667f (2012), extensively 
against motor vehicle dealers, accounting for all five cases by the FfC with CLA claims. State 
claims varied. 
143 Comparison of product codes aligned with the defendant entity codes. Frequencies of 
industry codes by five-digit NAICS code reveals that the top industries represented by defend-
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TABLE 4. Products at issue in state enforcer and FTC cases 
State cases (#) States% of FTC cases (#) FfC % of 
products products 
Construction/home repair 104 14.8 0 0.0 
Motor vehicle sales/lease 85 12.1 11 10.7 
Foreclosure rescue 36 5.1 1 1.0 
Vacation/travel/lodging 24 3.4 0 0.0 
Entertainment 18 2.6 3 2.9 
Membership clubs 17 2.4 0 0.0 
Debt settlement 17 2.4 0 0.0 
Legal services 16 2.3 0 0.0 
Debt collection 16 2.3 5 4.9 
Gas/fuel/electricity 15 2.1 0 0.0 
Medical or health services 11 1.6 13 12.6 
Website/data services 5 0.7 12 11.7 
Weight loss 3 0.4 9 8.7 
The types of UDAP claims in state enforcer and FTC cases overlapped, 
but also differed in key respects. Claims of deception about price and prod-
uct benefits were frequent for both enforcers. The FTC' s greater use of prod-
uct benefit deception claims was almost entirely attributable to its greater 
pursuit of misrepresentations concerning health benefits or weight loss, with 
41.2% of product benefit deception claims consisting of health or weight 
loss claims for the FTC versus 7.5% for the state enforcers. The FTC also 
brought a large number of claims for UDAP violations in data privacy/use 
and a larger share of cases against website/data service providers, while the 
states were mostly quiescent in this area. The state enforcers commonly 
brought UDAP claims for the seller's failure to deliver a product and for 
misrepresentations about the seller's identity, including the seller's licensure 
status and qualifications. A disproportionate share of these claims were in 
cases against the most frequent type of state defendant, home construction, 
and repair contractors, with such cases accounting for 59 .1 % of "failure to 
deliver" claims and 36.2% of "seller/product identity" claims for state 
enforcers. 
ants are legal services, consulting services, travel agencies, car dealers, consumer lending, 
commercial banking, and construction. 
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channels at issue in state cases, including telemarketing, 147 foreclosure, 148 
and debt collection. 149 
D. Relief Characteristics 
Public enforcers obtain three types of relief in UDAP actions: injunc-
tive relief, government money, and public compensation. 150 We examine the 
characteristics of this relief in four areas: an overview of the frequency, 
amount, and distribution among cases of the three forms of relief; the type of 
injunctive relief; the bases for recovering government money and the 
amounts of relief; and the amount of public compensation and how distribu-
tion of this relief is structured. 
The data on relief are restricted to cases that resolved through settle-
ment or contested decisions; in other words, we did not count default cases 
in the data on relief. This decision resulted in the exclusion of 110 of the 798 
cases (104 state enforcer cases and 6 FTC cases), leaving a non-default case 
total of 688 cases. Default cases are excluded because the relief does not 
reflect the likely outcome if contested by the defendant, and presumably 
money relief usually is uncollected. 
When reporting on the amount of money we use three terms that need 
explanation. First, net government money is government money exclusive of 
dollar amounts identified as suspended in the resolving document, which 
occurred with some frequency. 151 Second, dollar amounts for public compen-
sation constitute known dollar amounts for this relief, exclusive of cases in 
which the dollar amount of relief was not identifiable from the resolving 
document. 152 Third, the term total dollar relief equals net government money 
plus public compensation dollar amounts. 
1. Overview of Relief Obtained 
A defining feature of public UDAP actions is that enforcers obtain in-
junctive relief. States resolved all but 4.2% of cases with this form of relief, 
147 Consistent with long-term patterns, states and the FfC most heavily used the FfC 
Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR), 16 C.F.R. § 310 (2016), with states bringing a TSR claim in 
thirteen individual state enforcer cases and three multi-enforcer cases, and the FfC asserting 
TSR violations in ten of the thirty-nine non-UDAP claims, see also Widman & Cox, supra 
note 63, at 53 (noting that telemarketing laws are by far the most frequently used federal law 
by state enforcers). 
148 State claims for violation of the FfC rule on foreclosure assistance, 12 C.F.R. § 1015 
(2016), were brought in ten individual state cases, and one multi-enforcer case, while the FfC 
employed this rule in one case. 
149 Although not expressly authorized to enforce the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1692, 1692p (2012), state enforcers nonetheless brought claims alleging a violation 
of this law in ten individual state cases. 
150 See supra notes 50--56 and accompanying text. 
151 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
152 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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TABLE 6. Percentage use of types of conduct restrictions by enforcer type 
State CFPB FfC Multi-small Multi-large 
General prohibition of future 25.3 0.0 3.2 2.7 3.7 
UDAP violations 
Certain representations 15.2 35.3 37.8 21.6 14.8 
prohibited 
Certain disclosures required 11.9 5.9 23.5 32.4 14.8 
Prohibited from specific 17.3 5.9 12.4 8.1 25.9 
conduct at issue in Suit 
Requirements for contract 2.1 0.0 1.9 2.7 25.9 
consent 
Ban on some form of 19.7 11.8 10.1 21.6 0.0 
conducting business 
Service/contact or refund 4.5 17.6 0.9 2.7 11.1 
process requirements 
Limits on gathering/selling 1.5 0.0 8.3 8.1 0.0 
information 
Required training of employees 2.6 23.5 1.8 0.0 3.7 
Yet enforcers clearly had preferences not driven by the subject matter 
of the action. States, for example, favored generally stated prohibitions on 
future violations of their UDAP laws. The CFPB, perhaps reflecting its role 
as a supervisory agency as well as a UDAP enforcer, was much more likely 
to obtain relief about consumer service requirements and training of employ-
ees. The FfC and small multi-enforcer injunctive relief pattern was similar, 
with more use of limits on gathering and using consumer information, per-
haps reflecting the FfC's greater interest in data privacy issues. 
For two of these categories-a ban on some form of conducting busi-
ness and contractual consent requirements-we also coded for more detailed 
categorical descriptions. Large multi-enforcer cases focused on contractual 
consent restrictions. One of our sub-categories for contractual consent was a 
requirement that the defendant use a notice or form prescribed in the resolv-
ing document. This form appeared in only twelve cases across the 778 non-
default cases, or 1.5%, but this form of injunction was issued in three of the 
seven large multi-enforcer cases. 
Perhaps the most surprising result was the widespread use of a ban on 
certain forms of business conduct. Large multi-enforcer cases did not use 
this type of injunctive relief, but all other enforcer types obtained some form 
of business ban in a substantial number of cases. The CFPB and the FfC 
obtained a business ban in about 20% of cases, state enforcers obtained this 
relief in 38% of cases, and half of small multi-enforcer cases included some 
form of ban. Table 7 shows the breakdown of the various forms of this type 
of injunction for the states, the FfC, and the small multi-enforcers. 155 
155 The CFPB obtained a business ban in two cases. 
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TABLE 7. Percentage use as of various forms of 
conduct ban by enforcer type 
States FTC 
Any conduct in jurisdiction 9.3 0.0 
Conduct in defined sector 50.6 63.6 
Certain types of sales conduct 17.9 36.4 
Surrender license or no conduct w/out license 12.5 0.0 
Other conduct 9.7 0.0 









Finally, the enforcers also substantially differed in obtaining relief with 
or without an express time limit. The FTC and the CFPB strongly favored 
injunctive relief with an express duration. The FTC used a boilerplate 
twenty-year limit on injunctive relief in most of its administrative orders, 
accounting for 58.0% of all of FTC cases. Similarly, in 60.0% of the CFPB 
cases (all administrative orders), the agency made injunctive relief effective 
for a limited duration, with all but one of these cases establishing a five-year 
limit. State enforcers obtained time-limited injunctive relief in 6.3% of 
cases, with typical time limits of about five years. Small multi-enforcer cases 
did not appear to have duration limits on injunctive relief, while large multi-
enforcer injunctive relief was time-limited in two of seven cases. 
3. Government Money 
Public UDAP enforcers have authority to seek civil penalties for viola-
tions, and also obtain government money as a remedy on other bases. We 
divided receipt of money by enforcers other than for public compensation 
into five categories: (1) civil penalty; (2) fees and costs of investigation or 
litigation, including attorney's fees ("fees"); (3) cy pres awards; (4) money 
for other designated purpose; and (5) money that is not designated as to its 
basis, or that mentions multiple of the above purposes without differentiation 
as to amount ("undesignated"). This subpart presents data on the allocation 
of government money relief between these categories, the dollar amounts of 
such relief by enforcer, the use of this money, and the suspension of defend-
ants' obligations for government money relief. 
For federal enforcers, government money relief is easy to describe. The 
CFPB obtained a civil penalty in every case and directed that money in each 
instance to the agency's Civil Penalty Fund. 156 The FTC rarely obtained 
money other than for public compensation, but when it did the agency de-
posited the funds into the U.S. Treasury. States obtained government money 
in 72.7% of cases, and the basis for doing so in these cases encompassed 
numerous combinations of the five categories for this relief, as shown in 
Table 8. 
156 See 12 C.F.R. § 1075.100--110 (2016). 
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TABLE 8. Percentage of state cases by type and amount of 
net government money 
[Vol. 55 
Cases by type of net gov't money 
(%) 
$ amt. by type of net gov't money 
(%) 
Civil penalty only 
Fees only 
Cy pres+ 
Other designated only 
Undesignated only 
Fees + other 
Civil penalty + other 
























Note that the picture of state government money relief changes when 
viewed by the percentage of dollars attributable to each category of govern-
ment money instead of the percentage of cases in which the enforcer ob-
tained that type of relief. Undesignated funds were obtained in 21.4% of 
cases, but accounted for half of the net government money relief. The vast 
majority of this undesignated money was of one of two types. Of the $70.1 
million in undesignated government money obtained by the state enforcers, 
$35.8 million, or 51.1 %, identified no discernible basis for the relief, and 
$30.3 million, or 43.2%, was money undifferentiated between fees/costs and 
other designated money. 
Among the multi-enforcer cases, the parties rarely designate a specific 
use for government money. The typical language identifies several possible 
uses, all broadly stated, but expressly leaves the final decision to the enforc-
ers' discretion. 157 
The amount of government money obtained per case in which net gov-
ernment money relief was awarded varied by enforcer. Large multi-enforcer 
cases obtained far greater recovery amounts than other enforcer cases, fol-
lowed by CFPB and then FfC cases. The lower state enforcer amounts per 
case are predictable, but as with defendant size, the exceedingly small me-
dian amounts are noteworthy. Small multi-enforcer cases resolved with net 
government money relief amounts between the FTC and individual state 
cases. 
157 See, e.g., AVC, Pointroll, Inc., A.G. Case No. OL14-3-1096, at'![ 18 (Fla. Att'y Gen. 
Dec. 10, 2014) ("The Settlement payment may be used, to the extent permitted by law, for 
such purposes that may include, but are not limited to civil penalties, attorneys' fees, and other 
costs of investigation and litigation, or to be placed in, or applied to, the consumer protection 
law enforcement fund, including future consumer protection or privacy enforcement, consumer 
education, litigation or local consumer aid fund or revolving fund, used to defray the costs of 
the inquiry leading hereto, or for other uses permitted by state law, at the sole discretion of 
each State's Attorney General's Office.") 
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TABLE 9. Mean and median net government money relief by enforcer 



















The above data includes only government money that was ordered and 
not suspended in any way. Neither the CFPB nor the large multi-enforcers 
agreed to suspended government money as part of resolving an enforcement 
action. The FfC and small multi-enforcers, however, employed this practice. 
In the six FfC cases with a nominal civil penalty award, two were fully 
suspended and one was partially suspended. In the nine small multi-enforcer 
cases with a nominal civil penalty award, two were fully suspended. 
State enforcers employed suspension of awards extensively but un-
evenly across the different categories of government money. States were 
most likely to suspend government money relief with civil penalties, doing 
so in 103 of the 232 cases in which a civil penalty was nominally obtained, 
or 44.4% of cases with a nominal civil penalty award. In about half of the 
cases with a suspended civil penalty, the suspension was of the entire 
amount of the nominal award. The states were less likely to suspend fees, 
doing so in only 7 .8% of cases. 158 State enforcers suspended all forms of 
government money more often when the award was smaller. Accordingly, 
the percentage of nominally awarded money suspended was much less than 
the percentage of cases in which suspensions were used. While 133 of the 
454 state cases with some form of nominal government money, or 29.3%, 
had a full or partial suspension of that relief, only 9.1 % of the dollar amount 
of government money relief was suspended. For example, state enforcers at 
least partially suspended an award of "other designated money" in 21.5% of 
cases, but suspended only 3.1 % of the amount nominally awarded for that 
purpose. 
When states obtained government money, it was most often without use 
designation (i.e., any form of check to the State of X, Office of AG, Trea-
surer of State of X, etc. that does not state specific use of the money). The 
other common use designation was a continuing fund. The continuing funds 
commonly stipulated that money in those funds was to be used for consumer 
education, outreach, or advocacy efforts by the AG. Of the 412 cases with 
some form of net government money, 183 cases (44.4%) directed at least 
some of the money to a continuing fund. 159 
158 None of the six state cases with a cy pres award involved suspended obligations. 
159 States rarely directed government money to another government agency or, even less 
commonly, a non-government organization. Only the six cy pres cases involved use designa-
tions to a non-governmental entity. 
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4. Public Compensation 
All public UDAP enforcers obtain public compensation in a significant 
share of cases. Overall, enforcers resolved cases with public compensation 
in 432 of the total 688 non-default cases, or 62.8%. Rates of public compen-
sation ranged from 39.8% for the FfC to 100.0% for the CFPB. Our study 
sheds light on how enforcers structure public compensation and what is 
known about the type and amount of that relief. 
Enforcers used four principal methods to determine eligibility for pub-
lic compensation: (1) identifying specific consumers in the resolving docu-
ment to receive compensation; (2) granting compensation to complainants, 
either past or future or both; (3) identifying purchasers or affected consum-
ers and making some or all potentially eligible; and (4) giving the enforcer a 
sum of money and discretion to distribute that money to affected consumers. 
Table 10 shows that state enforcers used all these methods, and were alone in 
relying heavily on specific identification of consumers and relief to com-
plainants. Over half, 51.5%, of state cases distributed public compensation 
through one of these types, or used both methods. Only one FfC case and 
one multi-enforcer case employed either of these methods to determine eligi-
bility. The FfC had a consistent approach: obtaining a sum of money to 
distribute in its sole discretion. The agency used this method in 82.9% of 
cases with public compensation. The CFPB preferred distributing relief to all 
affected consumers, using this method in nine of its ten cases. 
TABLE 10. Eligibility criteria for public compensation by percentage of 
cases by enforcer type 
State CFPB FTC Multi-small Multi-large 
Complainants only 12.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 
Consumers identified 30.5% 0.0% 2.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
Consumers identified + complainants 7.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Purchasers/affected consumers 26.5% 90.0% 14.3% 33.3% 40.0% 
Discretionary decision of enf. 8.1% 10.0% 82.9% 41.7% 40.0% 
Other 8.6% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 
Cannot be discerned 6.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Public enforcers generally eschewed requiring consumers to file a claim 
to obtain relief. Of the 432 individual state cases with public compensation 
relief, only 96, or 22.2%, required consumers to file a claim to be eligible. 160 
Even in the 117 cases across state enforcers providing relief to all those 
160 The actual number of public compensation claims processes might be higher if enforc-
ers with discretion over the distribution of funds later required consumers to submit claims. 
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purchasing or affected by conduct, only 32, or 27.4%, of cases required a 
claim by the consumer for eligibility .161 
The resolving document mentions later private actions following public 
compensation in 175 individual state cases, 40.5% of cases with _public com-
pensation. In 168 cases, 96%, the resolving document expressly states that 
later private claims are not precluded. In the remaining 7 cases, 4%, a con-
sumer was required to submit an opt-in claim form with release to obtain the 
public compensation. Other than the seven opt-in cases, no case in our 
database resulted iri a final disposition stating that consumers would be pre-
cluded from bringing a later private claim. No multi-enforcer case required a 
release, and ten of seventeen multi-enforcer cases with public compensation 
expressly reserved all private claims. Similarly, no CFPB case required a 
release and eight of ten cases expressly reserved private claims. 162 
Unlike the recovery of government money, we could not establish the 
dollar amount of compensation in each case. In thirty-seven cases, or 8.6% 
of the 432 cases with public compensation, the enforcer obtained only non-
monetary relief. 163 Such relief primarily consisted of contract rescission, 
amending of credit reports, and ceasing of debt collection. Of the remaining 
395 cases of public compensation with money relief, we were able to deter-
mine a known dollar amount for all consumers receiving this compensation 
in 59.7% of cases, and were unable to determine any dollar amount in 25.1 % 
of cases. In the remaining 15.2% of cases we were able to determine a dollar 
amount for some but not all consumers, or the data was otherwise incom-
plete, such as a known dollar amount for an initial fund but with a defendant 
obligation to replenish the fund if it proved inadequate for the planned pub-
lic compensation. The percentage of known public compensation for all con-
sumers was similar across enforcers, with the exception of small multi-
enforcers.164 In reporting public compensation dollars, we use here all known 
dollar amounts. 165 
161 One of ten CFPB cases required consumers to submit a claim form to be eligible for 
public compensation. Whether claim forms were required in FTC and multi-enforcer cases is 
difficult to discern because of the high percentage of cases distributing public compensation in 
the discretion of the enforcer. Four of seventeen multi-enforcer cases and three of thirty-five 
FTC cases indicated a claim form requirement. 
162 The FTC neither required a release nor mentioned preservation of private claims in any 
resolved case. 
163 In an additional fifty-nine cases, or 13.6% of all cases with public compensation, the 
enforcer obtained both monetary and non-monetary relief. For example, the CFPB required 
amending of credit reports in four cases in which it also obtained monetary relief for 
consumers. 
164 The percentage of cases with public compensation in which we determined a known 
dollar amount for all consumers was as follows: States (53.8%), CFPB (60.0%), FTC (68.6%), 
small multi-enforcer (33.3%) and large multi-enforcer (60.0%). 
165 Included in public compensation are three state cases in which we included as a known 
amount estimates of public compensation provided in the resolving document. One case had 
estimated relief of $4,000,000 and the other two cases totaled $85,625 in estimated relief. 
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The dollar amount of known public compensation per case broken 
down by enforcer is similar to the results for government money. The me-
dian recovery for state enforcers, again, is noticeably small. 
TABLE 11. Mean and median known public compensation dollar relief by 


















The number of consumers receiving public compensation and the dollar 
amount per consumer was not evident from the documents examined in sub-
stantial numbers of cases other than with state enforcers. In state cases, we 
were able to determine the number of consumers receiving relief in 141 
cases, with 108 (or 76.6%) of those cases providing relief to consumers by 
specifically identifying them in the resolving document. The average number 
of consumers receiving relief in these 141 cases was 125 and the median 
number was 8. 
We determined the dollar amount of relief per consumer in 128 state 
cases, again heavily weighted to cases providing relief to specifically identi-
fied consumers. In 42 of those cases, all consumers received the same fixed 
dollar amount of relief, with an average payment of $3010 and a median of 
$1000. In the remaining 86 cases, the amount per consumer varied. The 
mean and median for the consumer receiving the highest dollar amount in 
these 86 cases was $6030 and $2431, respectively, while the mean and me-
dian for the lowest dollar amount was $648 and $250, respectively. While 
these per consumer payment amounts are not typically large enough for an 
economically viable individual private right of action, these amounts are 
greater than one imagines when thinking of "small dollar" consumer cases. 
In 8 cases, at least some consumers received $20,000 or more. 
Public enforcers do not often appear to settle for public compensation 
that is a partial amount of the consumer loss. We were able to form a judg-
ment about the amount of public compensation as a percentage of either 
purchaser payment or consumer loss in 140 cases. 166 In only 2 of these 140 
cases did the enforcer obtain less than 100% of the purchase price, while in 5 
cases the recovery exceeded 100% of the consumer payment or loss. 167 
166 We formed a judgment concerning the percentage recovery of payment or loss in the 
following number of cases by enforcer, which represented the indicted percentage of cases 
with public compensation by enforcer: States - 130 (35. l %), FfC - 3 (8.6%), CFPB - 3 
(30.0%), Multi-Small - 1 (8.3%), and Multi-Large - 3 (60.0%). 
167 Consent Decree, Washington v. Dish Network LLC, No. 14-2-10401-4 (Wash. King 
Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2014) (distributing $1 million to consumers after full refund contingent on 
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VI. ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES 
While the data may have many uses, our focus is enforcement. How do 
the various public enforcers exercise their considerable discretion under state 
and federal UDAP laws? To answer this question we identify and describe 
different strategies of public UDAP enforcement, before turning in Part VII 
to implications of enforcers adopting multiple strategies for the enforcement 
of laws that are substantially similar. We employ the concept of an "enforce-
ment strategy" to mean a distinct pattern of UDAP enforcement demon-
strated by one or more enforcers who exercise their discretion to enforce a 
state or federal UDAP law. The enforcers, however, are not all similarly-
situated. In particular, the two federal agencies differ in terms of both the 
scope of their jurisdiction and the scope of their UDAP authority from the 
state enforcers. Therefore, we take into account different factors to identify 
enforcement strategies among the federal enforcers than we do among the 
state enforcers. We begin with the two federal enforcers and then tum to the 
states. 
A. Federal Enforcement Strategies 
Among the federal enforcers, we look to a few case variables with 
power to draw meaningful distinctions among the cases and shed light on 
enforcement. We focus on six variables with federal enforcers: the type of 
defendant, whether an individual, an entity, or both; the size of the largest 
entity defendant; the type of relief, whether injunctive relief, public compen-
sation, or some form of government money; the size of monetary relief, in-
cluding both public compensation and government money; the forum in 
which the enforcer brings the case, whether judicial or administrative; and 
the means of resolution, such as a contractual settlement or a court order. 
Each variable reflects the enforcers' exercise of discretion and each illumi-
nates something important about that exercise of discretion: the first two 
shed light on the targets; the next two shed light on the relief; and the last 
two shed light on the process for obtaining relief against the targets. Among 
the federal enforcers, consistency across these case variables was so high 
that the data allowed us to identify distinct case types. 
amount of total claims); Assurance of Discontinuance, New York v. Prestige Auto., Inc., No. 
14-187 (Aug. 18, 2014) (consumers eligible for full refund plus 9% interest); Assurance of 
Voluntary Compliance, Michigan v. Ferrellgas, Inc., No. 14-1070 (Mich. Ingham County Cir. 
Ct. Sept. 18, 2014) (150% of payment refund); Settlement Agreement, Michigan v. Amerigas 
Partners, LP, No. 14-0248 (Mich. Berrien County Cir. Ct. Oct. 16, 2014) (150% of payment 
refund); Administrative Consent Order, Ace Cash Express, Inc., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0008 
(consumers to receive 101.3% of payments made to defendant). 
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1. CFPB Strategy 
The CFPB enforcement strategy is plain from the presentation of the 
aggregate data. Our data on the CFPB compared to other categories of en-
forcers was relatively thin-ten cases-but the case variables were so con-
sistent across the ten cases that it seems fair to conclude that CFPB had a 
standard approach to UDAP enforcement represented by a single case type. 
Every CFPB UDAP action in 2014 was against a sizeable entity and resulted 
in an injunction, public compensation, and a civil penalty. In eight of the ten 
cases the amount of the civil penalty was $2.75 million or more, with a mean 
slightly over $6 million and a median at exactly $5 million. The civil penalty 
was deposited in the CFPB Civil Penalty Fund in every case. The CFPB also 
consistently obtained substantial public compensation. The public compen-
sation often involved a massive return of money to consumers, with the 
CFPB using varied approaches to determine the type and distribution of this 
relief. Seven of the ten cases provided money relief for all affected consum-
ers without any action on their part. This enforcement strategy is consistent 
with Peterson's recently published empirical review of all CFPB enforce-
ment actions to date. 168 
2. FTC Strategy 
Unlike the CFPB, which uniformly presented a single case type across 
all six variables, the FTC commonly brought two distinct case types in addi-
tion to an assortment of other cases with some similarities but considerable 
variation. We first summarize and then look at key case variables that distin-
guish these two case types. 
The first category we call Type A, or Injunction Only, cases. The 
agency brought these actions against a single, often large, corporation for 
which the sole remedy was an administrative order designed to restrain the 
specific conduct at issue. These cases almost uniformly stated that the in-
junctive restrictions and reporting requirements continue for a period of 
twenty years. Type A cases were the most common, constituting forty-eight, 
or slightly more than half of the FTC cases resolved in 2014. 169 
A second category we call Type B, or Pervasive Fraud, cases. These 
thirty-four FTC actions targeted widespread fraud, often by a large number 
of smaller entity defendants and related individuals. These cases often re-
sulted in a judicial injunction that banned the defendants from engaging in a 
168 Peterson, supra note 29, at 1092. Also, consistent with Peterson's study is our finding 
that deception was often pleaded in conjunction with an unfairness pleading. Peterson's data 
also matches our findings that the enforcement actions under UDAAP resulted in both public 
compensation and civil penalty money. 
169 The Type A cases included a series of thirteen cases with one pattern, which were 
enforcement actions filed on the same day alleging deceptive website pledges by companies to 
comply with U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor Framework for ensuring the protection of personal data 
transferred outside the European Union. 
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certain business sector, and often froze the defendants' assets, with the 
money obtained typically directed to the FTC for public compensation at the 
agency's discretion. 110 
The agency's action against Finmaestros, a Florida-based company that 
claimed to provide computer security and technical support services, and 
several related individuals and entities, is representative of Type B. In its 
complaint, the agency alleged that defendants would cold-call consumers, 
often falsely claiming affiliation with a well-known firm such as Microsoft, 
and persuade the consumers to purchase computer security software, other-
wise available free on the internet, to address non-existent threats. 171 As a 
result, the agency obtained a default judgment permanently banning the de-
fendants from the marketing or sale of computer security and computer-re-
lated technical support services. 172 In addition, the agency also obtained a 
judgment for nearly $1.4 million for public compensation at the agency's 
discretion and a freeze on the defendants' assets. 173 
A small number of other FTC enforcement actions, twelve cases, 
rounded out the 2014 data. These cases involved some form of monetary 
relief, did not target pervasive fraud, and sometimes involved larger compa-
nies than FTC Type B Cases. For example, the agency obtained orders 
prohibiting both Apple174 and Google175 from allowing children to make in-
app purchases without parental consent and requiring the firms to reimburse 
harmed consumers. As detailed below, Type A and Type B cases consistently 
differ across several key variables. 
Defendants. 94.4% of Type A defendants were entities, while 64.5% of 
Type B defendants were entities. The FTC brought Type A cases against 
larger entities, with the highest medians for annual revenue and employee 
numbers. In contrast, Type B cases mostly involved small targets, with de-
fendant size similar to the most common state enforcement actions. These 
cases also were characterized by a disproportionately large number of de-
fendants per case, reflecting the FTC's effort in many of these cases to re-
strain a fraud coordinated among numerous individuals and entities. Table 
12 shows defendant numbers and size by these two case types. 
170 Six of the Type B cases involved pattern case default judgments obtained on the same 
day. 
171 Complaint at 6-9, FfC v. Finmaestros, LLC, No. 12-7195 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2012). 
172 FfC v. Finmaestros, LLC, No. 12-7195, 2014 WL 3743964, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July IO, 
2014). 
173 Id. at *5. 
174 Apple, Inc., FfC File No. 112-3108, 2014 WL 1330287, at *7-*9 (F.T.C. Mar. 25, 
2014). 
175 Google, Inc., FfC File No. 122-3237, 2014 WL 6984156, at *8-*10 (F.T.C. Dec. 2, 
2014). 
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TABLE 12. Defendant data for FfC Type A and Type B cases 
#of cases 
Mean # of entity defendants I case 
Mean # of individual defendants I case 
Mean # of total defendants I case 
% of largest entity defendants with no known size data or dissolved 
Largest entity defendant in case annual revenue - mean 
Largest entity defendant in case annual revenue - median 
Largest entity defendant in case # employees - mean 





















Litigation and Forum. Type B cases required litigation in federal court. 
Of the thirty-four Type B cases, twenty-three (67.6%) were in litigation for 
more than 180 days. The median time from filing to resolution was 395 days 
in Type B cases. All but one Type B case was filed and resolved in federal 
court. Type A cases were exactly the opposite. All but one Type A case was 
settled prior to filing, and all but two were administrative actions before the 
FfC. 
Injunctive Relief 176 Reliance on injunctive relief as the primary remedy 
perhaps most distinguishes FTC enforcement from the other UDAP enforc-
ers. Over half of FTC cases obtained only injunctive relief and are therefore 
Type A cases. Only one other UDAP enforcer, a state administrative agency, 
so eschewed money relief. 177 In Type B cases, the FTC obtained a ban on 
conduct in twenty of the twenty-eight non-default cases. The FfC obtained a 
ban on Type B defendants engaging in any business conduct in that sector in 
thirteen cases, a ban on using a certain form of sales conduct in five cases 
and both types of bans in two cases. 178 No injunctive ban was issued in a 
Type A case or any of the twelve cases not defined by either Types A or B. 
Money Relief By definition, the FfC did not obtain any money relief in 
Type A cases. 179 Only three Type B cases resulted in net government money. 
The amount of net penalties ranged from $490,000 to $1.5 million. 180 The 
agency obtained public compensation in every Type B case. Table 13 shows 
the amount of public compensation in Type B cases and in the twelve cases 
that were neither Type A nor Type B, all of which also resulted in public 
compensation. As with all FTC public compensation, this relief was almost 
exclusively in the form of a lump sum to be distributed at the agency's dis-
cretion. The primary difference between Type B public compensation and 
the remaining cases is that in Type B cases the FfC frequently obtained a 
176 Data for relief in FfC cases is reported only for non-default cases. See supra Part V.D. 
177 See infra Part Vl.B.6. 
178 The FfC also obtained a ban on any business conduct in a defined sector in the six 
Type B default cases. 
179 In two Type A cases, the FfC assessed and fully suspended a civil penalty. 
180 In one Type B case, the FfC suspended $710,000 of a $1 .2 million civil penalty, result-
ing in the $490,000 net penalty. The agency did not obtain net government money in non-
typed cases, although one case assessed and fully suspended a $2 million penalty. 
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comprehensive asset freeze, appointed a receiver, or the settlement included 
a provision requiring defendants to identify all assets and making the release 
from prosecution dependent on the accuracy of this disclosure. This structure 
of relief reflects a broad and forceful movement by the FTC to shut down a 
fraudulent scheme. In fourteen Type B cases, the FTC relied partially or 
solely on the asset freeze to fund public compensation in that case, some-
times suspending an otherwise nominal amount of public compensation. In 
eleven of these cases, the FTC established a much smaller known amount for 
public compensation and supplemented this amount with money recovered 
by the asset freeze. The small size of Type B defendants, and the high per-
centage of entity defendants either dissolved or of unknown size, render dol-
lar numbers for public compensation less meaningful than the asset freeze. 
TABLE 13. Public compensation data for FTC Type B and non-typed cases 
# of cases (non-default) w/ public compensation 
# of cases w/ known amount of public compensation 
Known mean amount of public compensation 
Known median amount of public compensation 
Known minimum amount of public compensation 
Known maximum amount of public compensation 
# of cases with asset freeze 
% of cases with asset freeze 
# of cases with receiver appointed 
% of cases with receiver appointed 
# of cases with defendant asset statement 





























The aggregate data make clear that state enforcers pursue cases against 
a large number of very small actors, yet also bring actions against some of 
the nation's largest companies. Less apparent in the overall data are the 
starkly different approaches to enforcement among the states, and the often 
surprising consistency among states that adopt the same enforcement strat-
egy. This section begins with a brief explanation of how we identify enforce-
ment strategies among the states followed by an overview of seven state 
strategies. We then disaggregate the state data to show the salient character-
istics of each strategy. 
1. Explanation and Overview of the State Strategies 
While we identified federal enforcement strategies based only on the 
exercise of discretion as reflected in case variables, we look to three factors 
to identify state enforcement strategies. In addition to case variables, we 
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also take into account the volume of cases an enforcer decides to bring and 
an enforcer's participation in leadership of multi-enforcer actions. The first 
factor, case volume, measures the total number of cases an enforcer resolved 
in 2014. This factor alone draws a line nearly down the middle of the state 
enforcers, separating no-volume and low-volume enforcers on the one hand 
from high-volume enforcers on the other hand. 
As with the federal enforcers, we also look to case variables, including 
the type of defendant, the size of the largest entity defendant, the type of 
relief obtained by the enforcers, the size of monetary relief, the use of gov-
ernment money, the structure of public compensation, and sometimes a few 
other variables, such as the use of outside counsel. Our application of these. 
variables to the cases, however, is different with the state enforcers than the 
federal enforcers. Federal enforcement readily demonstrated distinct case 
types. For the state enforcers, we identified similarities between enforcers, 
rather than within cases brought by the same enforcer, in discerning patterns 
in the case variables. 
In addition to case volume and the case variables, the third and final 
factor that informs our state enforcement strategies is leadership in multi-
enforcer actions. As explained earlier, multi-enforcer actions have become a 
dominant feature on the landscape of public enforcement. 181 These cases are 
often highly consequential, achieving remedies that shape conduct and com-
pensate consumers across the nation. Mere participation in these actions, 
however, reveals little about how enforcers use their powers. Participants 
may lend nothing more than a signature to a settlement agreement while the 
cost of failing to sign-on may mean the loss of millions of dollars. More 
illuminating is leadership in multi-enforcer actions as measured by member-
ship in the executive or monitoring committee. The enforcers who fill this 
role are sometimes the leaders who bring the case and always the leaders 
who move it forward and bring it to a close. 182 
The state enforcement strategies divide into two groups based on case 
volume. The four low-volume strategies are as follows: 
Strategy I: Non-Enforcers. Nine state enforcers made little or no use of 
their UDAP authority during the study period. 
Strategy 2: Low-Volume Enforcers. Another nine states resolved at least 
two but no more than five cases, with at least one case resulting in total 
monetary relief greater than the median. 
181 See supra notes 147, 161, and 164, and accompanying text. 
182 These three factors do not always have equal weight in defining our enforcement strat-
egies. For example, sometimes the mere volume of cases is determinative and the case vari-
ables inconsequential. The defining characteristics reflected in case variables have less 
relevance among enforcers who are not exercising their UDAP authority in a significant num-
ber of cases. 
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Strategy 3: Low-Volume Plus Enforcers. An additional four states also 
resolved at least two but no more than ten cases, with one (but only 
one) quite large case resulting in total money relief greater than $1 mil-
lion, which is at the 92.5% level for all cases. 
Strategy 4: Outsourcers. The most distinctive enforcement strategy was 
adopted by three states with a small number of cases heavily relying on 
outside counsel to sue very large companies for sizeable awards of "un-
designated" government money, along with two other states employing 
a similar approach. 
The three higher case volume strategies are as follows: 
Strategy 5: Street Cops. These six states completed a much larger num-
ber of cases, mainly against individuals or tiny businesses, and obtained 
small money awards, often dedicating amounts to specific consumers 
identified in the resolving document. 
Strategy 6: Street Cops Plus. A group of five states similarly resolved a 
large number of cases with the same characteristics as the Street Cops, 
but also had a set of actions against larger defendants with greater 
money relief, and were more likely than any group except Strategy 7 
enforcers to lead multi-enforcer actions. 
Strategy 7: Heavies. Nine states resolved a high volume of cases dis-
proportionally against larger entities for larger money relief, and domi-
nated leadership of multi-enforcer cases. 
Lastly, four states were outliers and did not fit any strategy, although 
these states shared some common characteristics. Case volume for these 
states was mid-range (nine to twelve). Three of the four states relied 
predominantly on one form of relief, with each of the three states relying on 
a different form of relief than the other two states. 
Figure 8 underscores the breakdown of the enforcers into strategies re-
lating to the volume of cases. The total number of cases by each strategy is 
measured by the bar graph associated with the left scale of Figure 8, while 
the line and right scale identify the number of cases per enforcer using each 
enforcement strategy. Throughout this subpart, we designate the colors used 
in Figure 8 for each strategy. 
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2. Strategies 1-3: Low-Volume Enforcers 
Strategies 1-3 are twenty-five states that resolved a small number of 
cases; an average of less than three and with only two of the states (North 
Carolina and West Virginia) completing more than five cases in 2014. The 
twenty-five states constituting the three lower-volume strategies accounted 
for almost half of the state enforcers and resolved almost exactly 10% of the 
cases. 
Nine state enforcers make little use of their state UDAP laws, and these 
nine states are classified in Strategy I as Non-Enforcers. Four of these states 
(District of Columbia, Kentucky, South Dakota, and Tennessee) resolved no 
UDAP cases in 2014. Three of these states had only one case, and two states 
had two or three cases that resolved with dollar recoveries less than half the 
mean and median for all state enforcers. Strategy 2 consists of another nine 
states with slightly higher case volume and at least one case with total 
money recovery greater than the median. Three of these low-volume states 
(Alabama, Nebraska, and Hawaii) obtained money recoveries at or near the 
90% decile, ranging from $246,000 to $510,000. 184 
The third low-volume strategy was employed by four state enforcers, 
each resolving only one case with a dollar recovery in excess of $1 million. 
California's large case resulted in 28.4 million in public compensation. Ex-
clude this case and the four Strategy 3 enforcers nonetheless recovered total 
money as a result of the big cases more than four times greater than the other 
eighteen low-volume enforcers. 1ss 
Leadership in multi-enforcer cases tracks well with the identified state 
enforcement strategies. Figure 10 shows multi-enforcer leadership as mea-
sured by the average number of leadership positions per state in each en-
forcer strategy. 186 These measures are consistent with substantially less 
engagement in UDAP enforcement by low-volume states. 
184 We placed Michigan in Strategy 2 rather than in Strategy 1 because its two cases 
obtained public compensation in an unknown amount but which required broad-based relief to 
gas customers that plainly would exceed the median total dollar recovery for all state enforcer 
cases. 
185 One of the Strategy 3 enforcers, North Carolina, is an uneasy fit in the low enforce-
ment categories, and is best described as falling between a Strategy 3 and Strategy 7 enforcer. 
The attorney general resolved ten cases in 2014, twice as many cases as any other Strategy 1-3 
enforcer other than West Virginia. Four of these cases, however, were default judgments, ac-
counting for more than one-third of the eleven default cases with Strategy 1-3 enforcers. In 
addition to being the most active of the low-volume enforcers in multi-enforcer leadership, it 
also paired with the FfC and two other states in a small multi-enforcer case, and with the 
CFPB and one other state in another small multi-enforcer case. 
186 Two of the Strategy 3 enforcers, California and North Carolina, each participated in the 
leadership of three multi-enforcer cases, accounting for the total participation of Strategy 3 
enforcers in multi-enforcer leadership and 60% of the total leadership for all Strategy 1-3 
enforcers. The percentage of states in each enforcement strategy that assumed leadership in 
two or more multi-enforcer cases shows almost an identical distribution across the enforce-
ment strategies. 
4J) 
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Strategy 4 Outsourcer cases share a number of striking differences with 
other state UDAP enforcement actions across five case variables, as de-
scribed below. 188 
Exceptionally and consistently large money awards. The money recov-
ery in Outsourcer cases was far greater than in any other strategy. The $53.2 
million in total money relief by these enforcers amounted to 22.9% of all 
money relief in state UDAP enforcement. The median total money relief of 
$2.2 million was more than 100 times the median in all state cases. Out-
sourcer states used outside counsel to obtain very large awards, but with the 
exception of New Mexico, did not substantially undertake the more routine 
enforcement work common among state enforcers. 
Focus on government money relief to the neglect of other forms of re-
lief Unlike other state enforcers, Strategy 4 enforcers relied almost exclu-
sively on government money as a remedy. Government money was obtained 
in all cases, but government money was the only remedy in nine of the 
nineteen Outsourcer cases. Relief was limited to just government money in 
only six other state enforcers cases across the entire database. Of the ten 
Outsourcer cases using outside counsel and the two similar South Carolina 
cases, injunctive relief was a remedy in just three cases, or 25.0%, compared 
to the average of 95.8% in all state cases. 
Government money recovery was largely undesignated. Unlike other 
enforcers, most of the government money recovered in Strategy 4 cases was 
a lump sum with undesignated basis for recovery. Moreover, the government 
money recovered by Strategy 4 enforcers was overwhelmingly given to the 
state attorney general for discretionary use. The remaining government 
money was applied to a continuing fund held by the state. 
Large, entity defendants. Large money awards flow from large defend-
ants, so unsurprisingly the defendants in Strategy 4 cases were generally 
much larger than defendants in any other strategy. Table 15 compares Out-
sourcer defendant size to numbers for all state cases. 
188 We provide data on all nineteen cases for this group of enforcers. The differences 
between case variables for these enforcers and all other state enforcers would be even starker if 
we excluded the seven cases (mostly from New Mexico) brought by staff attorneys. 
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TABLE 15. Defendant size (when known) - Strategy 4 (Outsourcers) 
compared to all cases 
% of defendants that are entities 
Largest entity defendant annual revenue - mean 
Largest entity defendant annual revenue - median 
Largest entity defendant # employees - mean 













Other attributes. Several other Outsourcers attributes were also distinc-
tive. Six of the fourteen cases, including both of the South Carolina cases, 
were against pharmaceutical companies. Across the state enforcement cases, 
settlement was almost always effected by an A VC or a Consent Order, either 
judicial or administrative. Strategy 4 cases, however, were resolved by con-
tractual settlement in eleven of nineteen cases, compared to just 3.0% of all 
state cases. 189 
4. Strategies 5-6: Street Cops and Street Cops (Plus) 
Street Cops are the antithesis of the Outsourcers. They are high volume, 
small target enforcers. The eleven state enforcers in Strategies 5 and 6 ac-
counted for 355 of the resolved cases, or 52.9% of the state case total. Yet 
these two enforcement strategies recovered only $11.3 million in total net 
government money, 8.7% of the total state recovery, and $85.0 million in 
known amounts of public compensation, or 8.3% of the total state recovery. 
The lower known dollar recovery for public compensation came despite 
these states having a lower rate of obtaining public compensation in un-
known amounts-15.4% compared to an overall rate of 22.7%. As a result, 
the mean and median recoveries of these enforcers were much lower, as 
shown in Figures 11 and 12. 
189 One contract term, appearing in a South Carolina settlement, is noteworthy: "the State 
or its attorneys agree to give counsel for Allergan at least ten (10) days written notice of any 
such request, along with a copy of the request, to afford Allergan the ability to take steps it 
deems appropriate to resist disclosure. The State or its attorneys will not produce the Settle-
ment Agreement prior to the return date of the request, unless otherwise required by state law 
or court order, in order to provide Allergan an opportunity to challenge the request." Settle-
ment Agreement between South Carolina, Allergan, Inc. & Allergan USA, Inc. (Jan. 23, 2014). 
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FIG. 13. PERCENTAGE OF CASES BY DEFENDANT SIZE FOR STRATEGIES 5--6 
COMPARED TO ALL OTHER STATE CASES 190 
Street Cop states also used different criteria for determining eligibility 
for public compensation. In over 75% of cases resolved by Street Cop states, 
consumers obtained public compensation when the enforcer specifically 
identified the consumers in the resolving document or by filing a complaint 
with the enforcer or defendant. Other state enforcers more often distributed 
public compensation to any consumer who either purchased the product or 
service or whom the defendant harmed. 
190 For a description of defendant size categories, see supra Table 2. 
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Strategy 5 enforcers and for all other state enforcers. But Street Cop Plus 
enforcers sometimes engage in enforcement activity or achieve results that 
more closely parallel Strategy 7 Heavies. For example, when the number of 
consumers receiving public compensation was identifiable, Strategy 5 en-
forcers obtained compensation for a median of three consumers, Strategy 6 
for a median of thirteen consumers, and the median number of consumers in 
all other cases was sixteen. 
Most importantly, Strategy 6 enforcers had frequency of multi-enforcer 
leadership close to the dominant role of Strategy 7 enforcers. As shown in 
Figure 10 above, the Strategy 6 Street Cop Plus enforcers participated in 
multi-enforcer leadership an average of slightly less than three times per 
enforcer, compared with slightly more than three times per enforcer for the 
Strategy 7 enforcers. Strategy 5 Street Cops averaged less than one leader-
ship role per enforcer, similar to the low volume enforcers. Furthermore, 
Strategy 6 enforcers sometimes engage in specific enforcement activity that 
more closely parallels Strategy 7. For instance, although states generally ob-
tained a freeze on defendant assets at a much lower rate than the FfC, Strat-
egy 7 enforcers (particularly New York) and Strategy 6 enforcers 
(particularly Arizona) accounted for a substantial proportion of state asset 
freezes. Of the sixteen cases in which states froze assets in some form, eight 
(50.0%) were Strategy 7 enforcers and six (37 .5%) were Strategy 6 
enforcers. 
5. Strategy 7: Heavies 
The Heavies and Street Cops both have high case volumes, but the for-
mer has larger recoveries per case and larger defendants. Strategy 7 enforc-
ers obtained $113.8 million in total money recovery. This amount constitutes 
49.0% of the known money recovery by state enforcers. Strategy 7 median 
recoveries were four to five times the corresponding level for all other cases, 
and the means were also higher. 
7 
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FIG. 18. PERCENTAGE OF CASES BY DEFENDANT SIZE CATEGORY FOR 
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As noted earlier, these enforcers also dominate leadership in multi-en-
forcer cases. All but one of the Strategy 7 states assumed a leadership role in 
two or more multi-enforcer cases. Overall, the nine Heavies accounted for 
48.4% of multi-enforcer leadership. 
6. Outliers 
The outliers all had mid-range case volume, from nine to twelve cases. 
Three of the four outlier states predominantly obtained a single type of re-
lief, although favoring different types. These three outliers include New 
Jersey, Maine, and Wisconsin. The Maine Attorney General obtained only 
public compensation with an injunction in all cases. Moreover, the state dis-
tributed public compensation to all harmed consumers in nearly all cases. 
The New Jersey Attorney General focused on government money in all 
cases. New Jersey obtained public compensation in addition to government 
money in eight of its ten cases, but it clearly emphasized government money 
in its UDAP enforcement. It obtained known amounts of public compensa-
tion in five of its ten cases, with a mean amount of $10,337 and a median of 
$5932, compared to substantial government monetary recoveries averaging 
$222,274 with a median of $39,326. In contrast, state enforcers overall ob-
tained more money per case in public compensation than in government 
money. 
Wisconsin's administrative agency obtained only injunctive relief in the 
ten cases it handled through an A VC. No enforcer other than the FfC relied 
so heavily on solely injunctive relief. Two cases were brought by the Wis-
191 For a description of defendant size categories, see supra Table 2. 
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consin Attorney General on behalf of the state administrative agency, with 
one case resolving through trial and resulting in over $1 million of govern-
ment money and almost $4 million of public compensation. 
The fourth outlier is Connecticut. Under Connecticut UDAP law, an 
administrative agency has sole discretion to bring actions, which the state 
Attorney General litigates. 192 In 2014, the state resolved nine cases, ob-
taining injunctive relief in every case and frequently imposing a complete 
ban on business in a given sector. The state also obtained public compensa-
tion in about half the individual cases in relatively small amounts. Most 
notable, the state was a frequent participant in small multi-enforcer litiga-
tion, including three cases in which the FTC paired solely with Connecticut. 
VII. ThtPLICATIONS 
This descriptive account of public UDAP enforcement in the United 
States has implications for conceptions of public enforcement, the exercise 
of public UDAP authority, and further research. 
A. Conceptions of Public Enforcement 
Our project captures a snapshot of public UDAP enforcement. The en-
forcement strategies we identify provide a new framework for thinking 
about public enforcement. In so doing, we uncover what public UDAP en-
forcement is, and we also begin to bring data to bear on what that enforce-
ment is not. Scholarship cannot treat public enforcement as a unitary or 
abstract concept, but must take into account the multiplicity of actual en-
forcement conduct. 
1. Different Enforcers Apply the Same Law with Different Results 
The data we present leads to one overarching conclusion: public UDAP 
enforcement by multiple enforcers leads to different strategies to enforce 
very similar laws. 193 As discussed above, scholars have debated whether di-
versity of enforcement provides a check against non-efficient enforce-
192 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
193 One could argue that at least some of the differences in enforcement conduct stems 
from a factor beyond the control of the enforcer: the limits on the enforcer's legal authority. 
For example, the FTC rarely uses its civil penalty authority, see supra note 179, which Con-
gress limited by statute. Nonetheless, the FTC suspended penalties in half the cases in which 
the agency imposed them, and the agency obtained only injunctive relief in a large number of 
cases when it also had public compensation authority. Although future research will need to 
examine the role that slight differences in legal authority play, see infra Part VII.C, at first 
glance the data does not suggest a correlation between difference in strategies and variations in 
UDAP statutes. 
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ment. 194 The enforcement strategies catalogued above seem to promote an 
environment that takes aim at different types of fraud and different types of 
actors and seeks different remedies. In other words, diversity of enforcers 
does provide diverse strategies even within similar legal authority. 
Even so, the variety of approaches employed is not infinite. The data 
sorted into a handful of enforcement strategies. If groups of enforcers have 
similar patterns as to the volume and type of cases resolved, as our strategies 
tend to show, then we have a new starting point for scholars considering 
normative implications of those different patterns. We can better understand 
UDAP enforcement, and perhaps other principle-based enforcement, as a set 
of options that can and often will produce different results depending on the 
desired outcome or point of evaluation. 
2. Public Enforcement Does Not Mirror the Assumptions 
Underlying Much of the Debate 
Deborah Hensler called for empirical data that might tend to prove or 
disprove the assumptions underlying many of the normative claims made 
about state AG enforcement, specifically in consumer protection. 195 She 
poses a series of questions that are unanswered by the current scholarship. 
We have begun to answer some of these questions. We also can evaluate 
some of the claims that have animated the normative scholarship on public 
enforcement, at least as those claims apply to UDAP enforcement. 
First, the data on public UDAP enforcement suggests that the analogy 
between private class actions and public enforcement actions that result in 
public compensation is flawed. The scholarly debate about whether to im-
port procedural reforms originally applied to class actions depends on this 
analogy. The reality of public compensation in UDAP cases, however, does 
not align with private consumer class actions. A typical consumer class ac-
tion involves thousands of people offered the opportunity to receive money, 
often through a process that requires responding to a notice and submitting a 
claim to receive a set amount of money that represents a small percentage of 
194 See Barkow, supra note 64, at 15. But see Minzner, supra note 68, at 2118-19. See 
generally supra Part Ill.A. 
195 Hensler, supra note 8, at 58-59 ("Lemos's analysis is similarly heavy on theory and 
light on empirics-indeed, her article does not contain any empirical data about the nature and 
frequency of the litigation that concerns her. How many state attorney general suits are there 
and what proportion seek individual monetary remedies (as contrasted with reimbursement for 
state expenses or contributions to state activities)? In suits in which state attorneys general 
pursue individual remedies, is the typical value of individual class members' claims large 
enough to make individual litigation practical, or could such claims only be pursued otherwise 
in much-castigated and increasingly endangered private class actions? Do empirical data sup-
port the proposition that state citizens' and class members' interests frequently diverge? How 
often do federal agencies and private class representatives join state attorney general actions? 
Are there differences in outcomes when state attorneys general act alone rather than with 
others?"). 
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the purchase price or loss. 196 Only a small portion of UDAP cases brought by 
public enforcers fits this description. Instead, public UDAP enforcement is 
best characterized by a multiplicity of approaches to determining eligibility, 
usually with no requirement of a claim, and routinely with full compensation 
for loss. 
Likewise, our data presented no evidence that preclusion of private 
claims following public compensation is a concern. No case resolved with 
the court or by settlement indicated preclusion of private claims without the 
consumer executing a release. And the number of cases in which consumers 
were asked to release claims as the price of obtaining public compensation 
was tiny-only seven individual state cases. Setting aside the legal accuracy 
of the claim that class procedures should be imposed on public enforcement 
because of later preclusion of private claims for money damages, 197 our data 
shows this concern is merely theoretical. 198 
Second, the fervor about outside counsel needs re-evaluation, at least as 
applied to public UDAP enforcement. Many scholars assume or imply that 
use of outside counsel is a common practice. 199 Outsourced UDAP enforce-
ment, however, appears rare. Only ten cases, representing 1.5% of state 
UDAP cases in our dataset, evidenced outside counsel. Moreover, two 
states-Mississippi and Nevada-brought eight of these ten cases. The evi-
dence supports that outsourced cases are different in kind than most state 
cases, yielding larger money results from larger defendants. The evidence 
does not support, however, that outsourcing is common. 
Third, our data complicates claims about the motivations of public en-
forcers, the claim that state AGs make enforcement decisions based on polit-
ical gain or supplementing state coffers. An attorney general motivated in 
this manner would presumably enforce against large companies, but our data 
suggests that almost all AGs, even the Heavies, bring a significant number of 
cases against tiny entities. Public enforcers can "trumpet" large money re-
coveries, 200 especially money distributed to voters in the form of public com-
pensation. But AGs are at least, if not more, concerned about injunctive 
196 See Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions As We Know Them: Rethinking the Amer-
ican Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 418-20 (2014). 
197 Compare Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 15, at 531--42 with Cox, Public 
Enforcement, supra note 50, at 2336-49. 
198 See supra Part V.D.4. 
199 See, e.g., Lemos, Privatizing, supra note 58, at 532 ("State attorneys general routinely 
hire outside counsel to handle aspects of the state's litigation work"); Lemos, State Enforce-
ment, supra note 15, at 735 ("State attorneys general frequently reach out to private counsel to 
assist with the state's business"); Lemos & Minzner, supra note 58, at 862--63 ("Complicating 
matters further, public and private enforcers increasingly work together ... where public 
enforcement agencies rely on private contingency-fee lawyers to litigate their cases."). 
200 See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 58, at 857. 
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relief, which is the one form of relief all public enforcers consistently 
obtain.201 
Fourth, Lemos and Minzner describe a "puzzling pattern in public en-
forcement: the tendency of many agencies to announce large financial recov-
eries while failing to collect them" and to bring cases against "judgment-
proof' defendants.202 Our data generally reflect the opposite in public UDAP 
enforcement. The FTC routinely engages in broad asset freezes and imposes 
receiverships. State AGs frequently have complicated payment schedules re-
quiring partial payments over time. Default judgment rates are low, gener-
ally around 6%, with only a handful of Strategy 5 Street Cop enforcers with 
high rates.203 
Fifth, and finally, at least one claim pressed by the critics finds support 
in our data: that enforcers use continuing funds. Over 44% of state cases 
with net government money deposited at least some money in a continuing 
fund. It is unclear whether use of those funds aligns with other conduct as 
neatly as the scholarship implies, however. Our data do not show obvious 
support for the notion that use of continuing funds by a state AG substan-
tially impacts enforcement work. 204 
As these five observations suggest, the data must shape our conceptions 
of public enforcement. Only by first recognizing what public UDAP enforce-
ment is (and what it is not), can we begin to address secondary questions 
regarding (1) why it is what it is and (2) whether it should be what it is. 
B. The Exercise of Public UDAP Authority 
This study also has implications for the exercise of public UDAP au-
thority: namely, it provides a footing for assessment and accountability. 
Some enforcers may conduct regular evaluations of their enforcement prac-
tices. Many enforcers, however, are likely not identifying goals, implement-
ing a strategy, or assessing their work to determine if they are achieving 
their goals. Our study can provide a means of assessment or further data to 
enrich ongoing evaluations. 
In addition to identifying what strategy a particular enforcer reflects 
and how that strategy compares to others, an enforcer can also identify spe-
201 Cf id. at 857 ("[F]inancially motivated agencies are apt to ... reduce their focus on 
nonmonetary remedies .... "); see also id. at 899 (claiming that public enforcers will readily 
settle for higher damage awards rather than injunctions banning defendant's practices). 
202 Lemos & Minzner, supra note 58, at 875, 884. 
203 Indiana, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Utah have the highest rate of default 
judgments. 
204 For instance, Low-Volume Enforcers use continuing funds at a much lower rate, but so 
do the Heavies. One would suspect total government money recoveries would be higher when 
the enforcer was obtaining money for a continuing fund, but the mean in such cases was 
almost identical and the median was slightly lower than that for all non-default cases by state 
enforcers: $I 0,097 for continuing fund cases and $11 ,985 for all non-default state cases. None-
theless, this is a causative question needing careful analysis, including a distinction between 
types of continuing funds. 
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cific practices employed by others that might prove valuable. For example, a 
number of state enforcers suspend government money awards, which come 
due if the defendant breaches the agreement.205 The FTC makes expansive 
use of asset freezes, while the state enforcers almost ignore this option.206 
Some state enforcers provide public compensation only for individuals who 
file a complaint with the enforcer's office, while other states broadly com-
pensate all harmed consumers.207 CFPB obtains all forms of relief in all 
cases.208 While the United States' disaggregated system of consumer protec-
tion allows for wide innovation, the laboratory of democracy only functions 
if other enforcers are watching and aware. 
Furthermore, this study provides at least the initial means to hold public 
enforcers accountable. As stated earlier, many state enforcers are doing little 
to enforce their UDAP law - including, at least in 2014, some of the largest 
states in the nation, such as California, Michigan, and Virginia.209 Some AGs 
who tout large multi-state monetary awards to the media may do nothing 
more than offer a signature, while a mere handful of state enforcers shoulder 
the difficult and critical work. A robust accountability tool would require 
data over multiple years, but this study is a start. 
C. Further Research 
This study opens multiple avenues for further research. As stated in the 
Introduction, our goal in this paper is descriptive: to identify the many ways 
public UDAP enforcers exercise their considerable discretion. Questions 
quickly arise, however, that move beyond description to causation: what fac-
tors explain the various enforcement outcomes?210 Some factors, such as le-
gal authority and perhaps agency funding, may act outside the enforcer's 
discretion.211 A longer list of factors may explain outcomes by acting upon 
the enforcer's discretion, such as citizen ideology; electoral pressures; 
agency culture; partisan affiliation; campaign contributions; the means by 
which the chief enforcer secures his or her job; and levels of private enforce-
ment, local public enforcement, and consumer protection advocacy. These 
questions await further investigation. 
205 See supra Part V.D.4. 
206 See supra Part VI. 
207 See Cox supra, note 50, at 2354-59, and accompanying text. 
208 See 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a)(2)(C) (2012). 
209 See supra Part Vl.B.1. 
21° Colin Provost has explored similar questions with regard to multi-state actions. See 
Provost, An Integrated Model of U.S. State AG Behavior in Multi-State Litigation, supra note 
92; Provost, Entrepreneurship, supra note 592. 
211 The obvious example here is that the FrC rarely uses its civil penalty authority, see 
supra note 179, and has restricted authority to impose such penalties. Nonetheless, the FrC 
suspended penalties in half the cases where the agency imposed them, and it obtained only 
injunctive relief in more than half its cases when the agency also had public compensation 
authority. See id.; see also supra note 180. 
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In addition, this study raises important normative questions. How 
should a public UDAP enforcer exercise discretion given limited public re-
sources? What cases should UDAP enforcers bring and what factors should 
shape case selection? As this study suggests, multi-enforcer cases have out-
sized influence, at least in terms of compensating harmed consumers and 
obtaining government money. Should state enforcers focus on larger targets? 
If so, what happens to the fraud and deception furthered by individuals and 
small entities that the Street Cops target? Is anyone left to enforce the law 
here if state enforcers set their sights elsewhere? Might less expensive, more 
efficient means of enforcement develop to address these harms? Further re-
search must explore these and other questions, always tethered to a data-
informed account of how, in fact, enforcers exercise their powers. 

